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NUTRIENT BALANCES IN AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 
REIJO PIRTTIJÄRVI 
Abstract. Agricultural nutrient runoffs are difficult to measure because of the nonpoint 
nature of the emissions. Policy solutions are emerging suggesting incentive schemes and 
farm co-operation to reduce the nutrient runoffs. An alternative way to tacIcle the 
problem is to calculate nutrient balances and set econornic instruments or direct regula-
tions on the nutrient surplus. However, nutrient balance calculations do have difficulties, 
e.g. unfavourable weather can increase nutrient surpluses dramatically, also depending 
on a crop. The sensitivity of crop response to weather conditions leads to similar 
responses with respect to the nutrient surplus. Unfavourable growing conditions lead to 
high nutrient losses. 
The farm model of assessing the cost-efficiency of input tax, output tax, and emis-
sion tax based on the nutrient surplus showed the input tax to be the best one with 
respect to this criterion. The effect of weather conditions on the cost-efficiency ranIcing 
showed that if the weather is unfavourable for crop growth the emission tax is more 
cost-effective than output tax only at 10% abatement level. Input tax is by far the most 
cost-efficient policy instrument of these three even under stochastic weather effects 
The final choice of a policy instrument is a matter of many perspectives, cost-
efficiency being one of them. In addition, criteria such as how easily the instrument is 
enforced, and how time- and site-specific the environmental responses are, play an 
important role in the final policy ranking. Furthermore, the information dimension also 
has to be considered in the policy choice. The better the policy instrument communi-
cates information both to the farmer and the policymaker, the more willing the farmer 
(the agent) is to provide as precise as possible data on the true impact his production has 
on the environment, and the better the policymaker (the principal) is conscious of the 
results of the policy it has established. With this respect, the nutrient balance calcula-
tions provide the best information dimension. 
Index words: agriculture, environment, information, modelling, nutrient balance, weather 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The public interest in finding ways to reduce nutrient runoffs to rivers and lakes 
has risen considerably during the past few years in Finland, especially during 
the year 1997. The reason for this is the eutrophication and algae growth in our 
watercourses due to the increased nutrient levels in them. In the public discus-
sion, agriculture has been labelled to be the maun source of water pollution. 
True, in part, but also a too simplistic point of view. 
The characteristics of agricultural nutrient runoffs are often not very well 
understood. The biological processes of nutrient flows in agriculture are diffi-
cult to measure and to control because of the nonpoint nature of the emissions. 
On the other hand, substantial progress has been made in the control of dis-
charges from point source activities. This is due to the fact that controlling point 
source discharges, e.g. from chimneys or drainage pipes, is a rather straightfor-
ward task; we only need to install a proper filter device or refinement facility at 
the end of the discharging pipe, and the problem is dealt with. 
Therefore, the characteristics and extent of water quality problems caused by 
nonpoint sources of pollutants emanating from agricultural activities highlights 
the urge to find efficient policy solutions to these problems, as noted e.g. by 
Weinberg (1991). From the viewpoint of an economist the pollution problems 
from agriculture are associated with market and policy failure in which the costs 
and returns of farm production decisions are inadequately internalised. As a 
result, private decisions lead to socially sub-optimal allocation of resources and 
production methods. The economic challenge, then, is to find the missing infor-
mation to market participants by assessing alternative policy instruments 
(Weersink 1997). These instruments can modify farmer behaviour with the view 
of achieving sustainable farming production objectives, or specified nutrient 
abatement targets. 
Thus, the characteristics of nonpoint source pollution make the design of 
agri-environmental control policies more difficult, yet challenging. A control-
ling measure such as an emission tax is usually an infeasible measure in the 
control of agricultural nutrient runoffs, since agricultural emissions are not 
easily identifiable. Therefore, input taxes or input restrictions are usually the 
preferred policy choices. However, from the theoretical viewpoint these are but 
the second-best policies. This leads us to questions, such as; 'What are the best 
ways to tackle the agricultural nonpoint pollution problem, and can we use 
emission taxes?'. Hence, the question is not what we should do but how we 
should do it. 
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1.2. Objectives of the study 
First, this work aims at understanding the characteristics of agricultural pollu-
tion and the different possibilities to reduce it through government or market 
based control policies. As the nonpoint source discharges have gained more 
relevance in water pollution, the characteristics of these must be taken into 
consideration in policy formulation. Environmental control policies are seen to 
be implemented in the principal-agent framework and applied through economic 
instruments, direct regulations and information policy. 
Secondly, the nutrient balance calculations are seen as a way to be able to 
assess the farm specific nutrient surpluses, and consequently the environmental 
load of a farm from a point source perspective. The different methods of the 
nutrient balance calculations (and their difficulties) are scrutinised and dis-
cussed. A special focus is on assessing the importance of weather factors influ-
encing the build-up of nutrient surpluses, which thus influence the choice of a 
policy instrument. In addition, the connection between the farm economic indi-
cators and efficiency in the nutrient use is studied. 
The main emphasis of the research is to examine the role of the nutrient 
balance calculations in nutrient abatement policies at farm level. The research 
problem is; "How does an emission tax based on the nutrient balance calcula-
tions compare with other control policies by the cost-efficiency criterion?". In 
this, the impact of the weather on the policy choice is assessed. The problem is 
approached through a modelling application on dairy farms, and the results are 
generalised at a broader level. In addition to the cost-efficiency criterion, sev-
eral other policy-ranking criteria are discussed in the final policy choice assess-
ment. 
1.3. Approach of the study 
Environmental problems of agriculture stem from physical phenomena. There-
fore, understanding the biological aspects of the nutrient flows also helps the 
economists to develop functioning agri-environmental policy solutions to tackle 
the agricultural pollution problem. The approach of the analyses conducted in 
this research is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Choosing and setting up a policy measure is based on biological and eco-
nomic information. Policymakers first focus on information on the present state 
of the environment. This information is presented to them by biological scien-
tists (soil and water scientists). They can also present the level of the desirable 
environment to the policymakers, although they seldom have enough informa-
tion to assess such a level precisely. 
The next step is to judge what is 'the best', i.e. the optimal, way to achieve 








this problem by comparing the economic implications of using different envi-
ronmental policy measures at farm level. The term optimal is split into five 
policy goals: cost-efficiency, information dimension, site- and time-specificity, 
enforceability, and correlation to water quality. The main focus is on assessing 
the cost-efficiency of the measures. Furthermore, the effect of weather factors to 
the policy choice is studied. 
This research draws a comparison of different policy choices. In addition to 
the two widely used environmental controlling measures, i.e. an input tax and a 
product tax, a new concept of nutrient balances is introduced; and its usefulness 
and implications as an output tax are considered as the third policy option to 
reduce environmental load from agricultural sources. 
The focus of the research is to set up a policy measure which fulfils best the 
specified criteria in a situation in which a government policy aiming at a 
reduction of 30% in agricultural nutrient leakages is established. The assess-
ment is conducted by modelling silage production. 
STATE OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT 














Figure 1. The approach of the study. 
11 
The decrease in the leakage is measured in the change of the nutrient surplus 
or deficit, i.e. as the difference between the nutrients entering the farm and the 
nutrients leaving the farm. The advantage of using the nutrient balance at farm 
level is that this makes it possible to assess agricultural load to the environment 
from the perspective of point source pollution, and not from the nonpoint source 
pollution perspective as it is usually treated. 
In addition, nutrient balances give information to farmers on the efficiency 
of using the inputs at their disposal, and work as an incentive to improve the 
usage of nutrients — especially in the manure. Furthermore, the role of informa-
tion is specifically analysed in this context, since the information dimension of a 
policy measure has recently gained more relevance. 
1.4. Pian of the study 
This work is structured as follows. Chapter 2 highlights first the main impacts 
(both negative and positive) agriculture has on the environment. Secondly, the 
chapter introduces the methods of the nutrient balance calculations (the NBCs). 
The previous experience in using the NBCs is presented in this part of the study. 
This paper discusses the research on the NBCs as policy tools. Lastly, the 
problems and biases which obstruct the calculation methods are covered, fol-
lowed by a description of the approach of the study. 
Chapters 3 and 4 form the theoretical framework of the study. In Chapter 3 
the agricultural production economics are described in a formal way, and the 
definitions for e.g. externalities, public goods, and property rights are reviewed. 
Furthermore, the theoretical solutions for internalising the externalities are ii-
lustrated. Chapter 4 scrutinises the characteristics of agricultural pollution. The 
main interest is to assess the economics of nonpoint pollution. The theory of 
nonpoint source pollution has recently been progressing, and some of these 
findings are reviewed here. The review outlines some of the policy methods 
available in controlling environmental pollution. The role of information in 
policy formulation is also discussed. Furthermore, the criteria for the choice of a 
control instrument are analysed in more detail. 
The rest of the study scrutinises more closely the feasibility of the nutrient 
balance calculations in the Finnish conditions. In Chapter 5 the feasibility and 
the accuracy of the balance calculations are studied with respect to the weather 
conditions. This is done using the crop level data from the Agricultural Re-
search Centre. In Chapter 6 a case study utilising the NBCs on dairy farms in 
Kainuu is conducted. A farm level model of using different policy instruments 
in pollution abatement is presented. The model is a simulation of a profit 
maximising farmer who produces silage. The leakage function of the model for 
nitrogen is based on the NBCs. Different scenarios are conducted to assess the 
policy instrument choice. The impact of weather factors on the choice of the 
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policy instrument is also examined. Chapter 7 concludes and discusses the 
findings of the modelling in the framework presented above. Chapter 8 presents 
a sununary of the study. 
2. Agriculture and the environment 
2.1. The impact of agriculture on the environment in Finland 
2.1.1. Negative effects 
Water quality problems caused by farming have become a major environmental 
policy issue in many countries, including Finland. This can be seen from the 
heated discussion that took place in early 1997 when the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment put forward the recommendation for the nitrate directive. The exten-
sive algae growth in the Finnish lakes and rivers and the Gulf of Finland during 
the warm summer of 1997 raised the eutrophication discussion into the lime-
light. Eutrophication of watersystems is the principal negative impact agricul-
ture has on the environment in Finland. However, there are also other negative 
pressures caused by agriculture on the environment, e.g. atmospheric pollution 
(volatilisation), erosion, soil compaction, and detrimental effects on biodiversity. 
Various Finnish studies (e.g. Rekolainen et al. 1992, Kauppi 1997) indicate 
that agriculture is the most important sector causing environmental burden to 
watersystems. Presently, agriculture accounts for over 1/3 of the total nitrogen 
load and over 1/2 of the phosphorous' load to watercourses in Finland. Al-
though environmental policy measures such as the Finnish agri-environmental 
programme (FAEP, established in 1995), based on EU regulation EEC/2078/92, 
are having positive impacts on the reduction of nutrient load from agricultural 
sources, nutrient runoff problems are far from solved. The key reason for this is 
that the point pollution (PP) of industries or settlements is much more easily 
controlled than the nonpoint pollution (NPP)2 of agriculture. 
The total phosphorous load from cultivation of arable land is estimated to 
range between 2,000 and 4,000 tonnes per year, and, correspondingly, the 
nitrogen load between 20,000 to 40,000 tonnes per year. These figures do not 
contain the direct load from manure storage facilities (Rekolainen et al. 1992), 
and they are from the era before the FAEP. 
1  Usually, phosphorous is the limiting factor for algae growth in Finnish lakes and rivers. 
2  In this research the terms `nonpoint pollution' and `point pollution' are used although the 




Most of the agricultural production is concentrated to Southern and Western 
Finland. Thus, the impact of agriculture on surface waters in those areas is 
greater than in the northern regions. It has been estimated that 20% of lakes and 
about 55% of rivers in Finland are eutrophic. Indeed, the quality of the 
groundwater is quite good in Finland. The nitrate levels in groundwater supplies 
remain in most cases below 25 mg/1 (MMM 1994), in contrast to the EU nitrate 
directive which sets an upper-level of 50 mg/1 for nitrates in drinking water. 
In addition, agriculture creates gaseous emissions. The most relevant ones 
are ammonia (NH3), nitrous oxide (N20) and methane (CH4). More than half of 
the NH3 depositions originate from abroad, but local emissions also contribute 
to eutrophication and acidification (MMM 1995). In 1990 the ammonia emis-
sions were about 50,000 tonnes per year (YM 1991). 
Agriculture accounts for almost half of the anthropogenic (i.e. from human 
activities) nitrous oxide emissions in Finland. These total emissions were 18,000 
tonnes per year in 1994. The total annual N20 emissions were estimated at 
about 22,000 tonnes (Pipatti 1997). 
The anthropogenic methane emissions in 1990 and 1994 were estimated at 
about 250,000 tonnes per year. The main sources were landfills and agriculture. 
Agricultural methane emissions (mainly from enteric fermentation) were about 
100,000 tonnes. In contrast, the CH4 emissions from nature (mainly from marshes) 
were 820,000 tonnes in 1994 (Pipatti 1997). 
But, as mentioned earlier, agriculture accounts for the major part of the 
nutrient losses to watercourses, as can be seen in Figure 2. Therefore, the 
interest to find the proper ways to tackle the problem of controlling agricultural 
nutrient runoffs is growing; and this forms the basis for the present work. 
Regional studies indicate that phosphoric load is considerably greater in 
Southern Finland than in other parts of the country. In areas close to certain 
rivers the load is at present over 2 kg/ha/year (MMM 1994). 
Phosphorous 
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Figure 2. Pollution to watercourses by sector in Finland in 1990. Source: 
Rekolainen et aL 1992. 
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During the recent years 25 kg of phosphorous has annually accumulated into 
the soil (MMM 1995). The FAEP will bring this level down as the base level 
fertilising of phosphorous will he lowered to 15-20 kg/ha for cereals, for exam-
ple. However, the research results from 1995 show just a slight decrease in the 
level of fertilising (Grönroos et al. 1997), but this is partly caused by the late 
implementation of the FAEP during that year. The coming years will show more 
clearly the true impact the programme has on the Finnish environment. 
During the past decades, the intensity of input use in arable farming has 
risen. This can he seen by looking at the development in fertiliser usage. The 
fertiliser sales (equals the actual use) have risen considerably from the 1950s 
(Figure 3). However, at the beginning of this decade there has been a substantial 
decrease in fertiliser sales in terms of ali three nutrients. It is important ,to note 
that the tax on fertilisers was raised considerably at that time. The tax revenue 
(FIM 650 mill. in 1992)3 was used to cover the exporting costs of the oversup-
ply of agricultural products. Some FIM 44 mill. of the tax revenue was used for 
agri-environmental investments (YM 1992). 
In 1990 the tax on nitrogen in compound fertilisers was 0.15 FIM/kg, but it 
was raised to 2.90 FIM/kg in 1992 (Sumelius 1994). This seems to indicate that 
there exists a negative price elasticity on fertiliser purchases, although Ryhänen 
(1994) estimated the fertiliser prices to be fairly inelastic in Finland. Presently, 
there is no tax on fertilisers as Finland joined the EU in 1995 and the earlier tax 
was abolished. 
Figure 3. Fertiliser sales in Finland in 1950-1995. 
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Figure 4. Pesticide use in Finland in 1975-1996; active ingredients. Source: 
KTTL 1997 ref MT 1997. 
With respect to the use of plant protection substances, the use of active 
ingredients has declined considerably during the past two decades (Figure 4). It 
is mostly herbicides which have been used in larger quantities in the Finnish 
agriculture, as the cool climate gives `natural protection' against many pests and 
diseases common in the southern countries. In international comparison Finland 
has very low pesticide use (only 0.6-0.7 kg/ha). It is estimated that the pesticide 
emissions from arable land to watercourses are about 0.1-1.0% of the used 
pesticides (Laitinen et al. 1996). 
The drastic decrease in the use of pesticides is partly due to the introduction 
of new pesticide products, such as small dose herbicides (MMM 1995). In 
addition, the training of farmers in the use of pesticides and testing of the 
spraying equipment, which are criteria for the agri-environmental support, have 
a similar impact on the use of pesticides. 
The concentration of the cattle production in Central, Eastern, and Northem 
Finland has decreased the share of grass in the cultivation areas of Southern 
Finland. This has led to erosion, which increases the phosphoric load. Soil 
compaction has also increased erosion and surface runoff as rainwater is not 
absorbed to the soil but gets f1ushed away eroding soil particles and, thus, 
nutrients to watercourses (MMM 1995). Compaction has been caused by inten-
sive production, especially mechanisation and the increase in heavy machinery. 
Both erosion and soil compaction reduce the soil fertility and lower the yields. 
It is also estimated that changes in agriculture have caused altogether 300 
plant and animal species to become endangered. In 1991 it was estimated that 
there are almost 1,700 species in Finland that are being endangered. One fifth of 
these are species living in connection to human activities, like in agricultural 
biotopes (YM 1995). The majority of endangered species in cultivated areas 
occur in the traditional biotopes, and others have become endangered as a result 
of changes in the cultivation methods. 
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2.1.2. Positive effects 
In the long run an ever increasing share of the total economic value of agricul-
ture will be derived from public goods produced by ecologically more beneficial 
farming. It is clear that agricultural practices maintain the agricultural country-
side environment (ACE). It is an array of many public goods, amenities, and 
services. Agriculture should no longer he regarded merely as a producer of 
foodstuffs but a producer of many environmental public goods, of which agri-
cultural landscape and biodiversity are the two most crucial ones (Aakkula 
1996, Pirttijärvi et al. 1995). 
Finnish rural landscape is greatly valued by Finns. (Of course, the beauty is 
in the eye of the beholder and not everybody values rural landscape or finds 
open field areas attractive.) Only nine per cent of the land area is cultivated. 
Particularly in Southern Finland open arable land areas are characteristic of the 
rural landscape. The greatest threat to the rural landscapes is caused by discon-
tinuing of agricultural production and depopulation of rural areas. Agriculture is 
the backbone of the countryside in Finland. 
Finnish rural landscape consists of many small features, and it is diversified 
in its detafis. Arable land is often located like a mosaic on lake shores or in the 
middle of forests. The size of open arable land areas varies from a few hectares 
to tens of hectares. The large open arable land areas in the river valleys in 
Southern Finland, which can he 500 to 1,000 hectares, form an exception to this. 
(MMM 1994). 
In all, animal husbandry has created the most versatile types of landscape 
among the rural cultural landscapes in Finland. Natural pastures and woodlands 
used for grazing, as well as natural meadows cleared in forests and on shores for 
the harvesting of winter fodder with their barns and fences have been the 
dominating elements of the cultural landscapes of rural areas. At the beginning 
of this century cultivation by clearing and burning-over woodland was still the 
form of cultivation that dominated the landscape in eastern parts of the country. 
In the past few decades specialisation in cereal cultivation and decrease in 
animal husbandry, especially on the southern coast, has reduced the versatility 
of the rural landscape. As Finland is dominated by closed forest landscape, both 
small and large fields and pastures in all parts of the country are important for 
preserving an open landscape. 
Species that favour the cultural environment of rural areas constitute a con-
siderable share of the species in Finland. The managed traditional biotopes 
created by grazing and cutting have the greatest variety of species. Over a third 
of vascular plant species (400 to 500 species) have benefited from grazing and 
cutting. Apart from plants, managed natural meadows and pastures are impor-
tant for butterflies and other insects (MMM 1994). 
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In the beginning of 1995 there were almost 2.9 mill. hectares of land and 
water areas which were under some kind of protection scheme (MMM 1995). 
This is about 8% of the total area of Finland. The proposal for the adaptation of 
the EU habitats directive aims to further extend these areas to cover over 10% of 
Finland under the `Natura 2000' programme. This has aroused a number of 
arguments because the proposal (covering altogether 469,000 ha of land and 
water area) also comprises private land area (107,000 ha) under the scheme, and 
the economic use of this land would be restricted. 
2.2. Nutrient balances as environmental indicators 
2.2.1. Nutrient balance calculations 
The nutrient balance calculations (NBCs), also referred as rnineral balance, 
nutrient budget or excess nutrient calculations, have become very commonly 
used during this decade. The idea behind these calculations is rather old and 
simple notion; we compare the nutrients entering a system to the nutrients 
leaving a system at certain observation points. If the balance (i.e. the nutrient 
input minus their output) is positive, there is an oversupply of nutrients entering 
the system. In the opposite case, the negative balance indicates that the system 
has lost some of the nutrients in the production process. Huang and LeBlanc 
(1994) call this 'the nutrient mining'. This kind of calculation makes it possible 
to measure the amount of nutrients emitted to the environment — a very attrac-
tive point of view from the perspective of a policymaker. 
The first major international effort to set a common basis for the calculation 
methods was the EU funded three-year (1993-1995) project, in which the bal-
ances were calculated for N, P205 and K20 on regional and on national levels, 
as well as by farming type (Brouwer et al. 1995, Schleef and KleinhanB 1994). 
Based on the principles of this project, the OECD (1997) started a harmonising 
work on the nutrient balance calculations when setting up international environ-
mental indicators for comparison purposes (much like the PSE indicator). In 
addition, Eurostat (1997) has started collecting data from the EU member states 
for the NBCs. 
In Finland the balances have been calculated already in 1970s and 1980s 
(Väisänen 1996). However, these have started to gain more relevance only 
during the past 10 years, especially in organic farming where the NBCs have 
become a fundamental factor in the farm production planning. 
In many countries the balance calculations have been used to estimate the 
nutrient flows at farm, regional, and national level. As the information derived 
from the calculations is used for various purposes, many different methods 
were, and still are, used in calculating the nutrient balances. This is true both in 
Finland and in the international context. 
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Table 1. General ways to calculate the nutrient balances. 
Balance 
Nutrients in 	 Farm gate 	Surface 	Cattle 
inputs 
1 Fertilisers 
2 Purchased manure 
3 Farm' s own manure 
4 Purchased fodder 
5 Farm' s own fodder 
6 Purchased seeds 
7 Farm' s own seed 
8 Purchased livestock 
9 Biological fixation 	 (*) 
10 Atmospheric deposition 	 (*) 
outputs 
11 Crops sold 
12 Crops for feed 
13 Crop residues 
14 Livestock products sold (including manure) 
15 N evaporation 	 (*) 
Nutrient surplus or deficit = (1+...+10)-(11+...+15) 
Nutrient efficiency ratio = (11+...+15)/(1+...+10) 
The * mark in the table indicates that the item is included in the corresponding balance formula. 
Table 1 shows the schematics of three different methods which are used in 
Finland to calculate the nutrient balances: farm gate balance, surface balance, 
and cattle balance. 
The idea behind the farm gate balance is to measure how much the farm uses 
purchased nutrient inputs in its production, and to compare these figures to the 
nutrient contents in the outputs sold (or given away) from the farm. The level of 
observation is the actual inflows and outflows of nutrients through the farm' s 
`gate' In other words, the nitrogen and phosphorous4 contents of the inputs 
-entering the farm are compared to the corresponding figures exiting the farm in 
the outputs sold. Natural phenomena, such as atmospheric deposition of nitro-
gen in the soil and biological fixation by leguminous crops (in the parentheses) 
4 We limit ourselves to examining only N and P nutrients as these are the two most important 
forms of agricultural runoffs. 
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can also be included in the calculation5. The difference between the inputs and 
the outputs gives us the balance, i.e. a 'surplus or a deficit of nutrients. 
The surface balance is calculated as a difference between the nutrients enter-
ing into and exiting from the soi! surface. Within the inputs, the main compo-
nents the calculation takes into account are the use of chemical fertilisers and 
manure. For the part of the outputs, the nutrient contents of the harvested crops 
are calculated. Subtracting the latter from the former gives a gross surface 
balance. If we also take into account the evaporation of the nitrogen in the 
manure and the fact that ali nitrogen in the manure is in a infeasible form for 
plants to be utilised, we get a net surface balance. Usually a 30% estimate for 
non-available nitrogen is subtracted from the nitrogen in the manure then bear-
ing then a closer link to the water pollution issues (e.g. Brouwer et al. 1995). In 
addition, atmospheric deposition is taken into account in the surface balance as 
well as biological nitrogen fixation and the use of sewage sludge in agriculture. 
The nitrogen fixation, in particular, is often significant at farm — e.g. in organic 
farming. 
The cattle balance indicates the difference between the nutrients in the 
animal foodstuffs and the nutrients in the animal products leaving the produc-
tion facility. Theoretically the balance should yield the amount of nutrients 
excreted in the manure during the production process. This type of balance 
calculation is used in the Finnish production control system run by the extension 
agencies (see e.g. Helander 1996). 
2.2.2. Information in the nutrient balance calculations 
In ali three calculation methods the subtracted figure indicates a farm-specific 
nutrient surplus or deficit6. The surplus here means the amount of nutrients that 
the production process is unable to capture. Dietz (1992) defines the surplus 
slightly differently as the amount of nutrients actually lost on a farm minus the 
amount of nutrients nature can sustainably process at the location concerned. 
With this latter definition, though, we encounter the problem of defining the 
assimilative capacity of nature which, no doubt, varies by each location. There-
fore, the former definition is used, also because of its closer link to the produc-
tion process. 
Theoretically the first two balances should yield the same result, but nor-
mally these balances differ. According to Brouwer et al. (1995), the difference 
probably stems from using normative coefficients in assessing the nutrient 
5 Strictly speaking these do not enter the farm through the gate. However, including these in the 
calculation enhances the information design of the calculation method. 
6 For simplicity we talk here mainly about surplus because that is the most common case. 
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content in animal manure, crop production, and livestock production. The nutri-
ent surplus indicates in the short run the potential of polluting charges. In the 
long run, the averages of nutrient surpluses approximate the average farm envi-
ronmental load. 
Most likely the balance (i.e. the inputs minus the outputs) is positive, which 
means that some of the nutrients have accumulated in the soil, evaporated into 
the air, or leached to the watersystems. In organic farming the nutrient balances 
usually show a very small surplus or even deficit when calculated by the farm 
gate balance (Väisänen 1996). However, if biological nitrogen fixation, which 
is very difficult to measure reliably, is included, surpluses also emerge there 
(i.e. the second law of thermodynamics holds). 
The NBCs lack the exact information on where the nutrients have exited. 
Therefore, the nutrient balance calculations are more like indicators than exact 
measurement devices of nutrient runoffs. The different ways of calculating the 
balances have their benefits, but also their difficulties, as will be discussed later. 
Calculating nutrient balances at farm level is a rather straightforward proce-
dure, but it can be a tedious one. Keeping account of ali nutrients entering the 
farm causes extra work in animal husbandry farms. It is particularly difficult to 
keep track on the nutrients in the feeding stuffs, especially if these are not 
indicated in the feeding stuff packages. 
Coefficients must be used in calculating the nutrient contents in the har-
vested crops and in the manure. Expressing unequivocal nutrient coefficients for 
different animals is a difficult task. Much of the magnitude of the coefficients 
depends on the feeding process and on the capability of the animals to process 
their feed. 
The Finnish agri-environmental programme requires a farmer to carry out a 
nutrient analysis of manure once in every five y,ears (MMM 1994). This meas-
ure makes it easier for the farmer to also assess the nutrient flows of a farm. A 
list of the Finnish nutrient coefficients in crops and manure is given in Annex 1. 
These coefficients are used in OECD and Eurostat calculations as well as in the 
Finnish regional calculations presented in Section 2.3. 
In general, nutrient balances are rather ineffectual indicators unless related to 
agricultural land area or the total input of nutrients, for example. The nutrient 
use efficiency can be expressed by comparing the nutrient output to the input of 
them. The quotient tells how well the nutrients entering the system are captured 
by the production system. 
The surpluses per hectare, as indicated by the balance calculations, vary a 
great deal across different countries, but the efficiency quotient is more even in 
different countries. The quotient, however, varies considerably by farming type. 
In Finland the efficiency ratio for cereal farms varies around 50-70%, whereas 
for dairy farms the corresponding figure remains in the range of 20-40% 
(Pirttijärvi 1996, Lankoski 1996). 
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In this connection, it is important to note the results of the Finnish study by 
Esala (1995) on crop level nutrient utilisation. He estimated that even under 
prosperous growth conditions only about 50% of the fertiliser nitrogen is uti-
lised by the crop, 15% to 20% remains in the straw, and 30% accumulates into 
the soil. During a less prosperous year, the crop uptake is only 25% to 30% of 
the fertiliser nitrogen. 
In order for a farmer to better realise the importance of nutrient bookkeeping 
as a good management tool, monetarisation of the nutrient surplus is needed. 
For example, a relatively small decrease of 10% in the nutrient surplus can be 
converted to the monetary value. Let us look at a farm which has surpluses of 
100 kg/ha of nitrogen, 30 kg/ha of phosphorous and 70 kg/ha of potassium. If 
the prices for these nutrients are 4 FIM/kg for nitrogen, 9 FT:Ml/kg for phospho-
rous and 2 FIM/kg for potassium7, a 20 hectare farm reducing ali these sur-
pluses by 10% saves FIM 1,600 in nutrient values. 
We have to note that the nutrient balances do not tell precisely where the 
nutrient losses emerge from and to what extent the losses leach to the water-
courses or discharge into the air. Nevertheless, substantial nutrient losses tell 
the farmer that he has an efficiency problem in using the inputs in his disposal; 
and that there is also an environmental problem. A farmer then faces many 
options to choose from to reduce the nutrient losses. Consequently, nutrient 
balances elicit a farmer to opt for environmentally sound management practices. 
Therefore NBCs act as an information instrument in pointing out the environ-
mental bottlenecks in the farm management. 
As the nutrient balance calculations alone are usually insufficient to tell what 
to do, the balance sheet should be closely integrated to other farm planning and 
monitoring procedures, such as soil analysis. Götz and Zethner (1996) give an 
extensive (for Austrian conditions, but also applicable to Finland) list on the 
measures through which the nutrient surplus can be reduced: 
minimising the use of commercial fertilisers 
improving the use and application of manure 
soil analyses of Nmin and Norg to pian fertiliser use 
increasing consideratiö n of nutrient return from crop residues 
reducing feed imports (e.g. protein feeds) 
enlarging grasslands, converting arable land into meadows 
protecting the soil by a vegetation cover (crop rotation and 
underseed) 
reducing ammonia emissions through measures concerning live- 
stock 
7 These prices are calculated from compound fertilisers having the highest amount of the 
corresponding nutrient. 
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reducing the use of nitrogen fertilisers to curb denitrification 
tillage and landscape planning measures to minimise soil ero-
sions 
supporting biological farming which uses substantially fewer 
commercial nutrients 
2.3. Experiences and research on nutrient balances 
Calculating the net surface balance levels out the differences of nutrient usage 
efficiency between cereal farms and animal husbandry farms. In the studies of 
Brouwer et al. (1995) and Schleef and Kleinhan13 (1994) 30% of the nitrogen in 
manure is subtracted to get the net surface balance calculation. This net balance 
is more closely related to the problem of nutrient losses to watersystems. How-
ever, this approach biases the real problem of agricultural nutrient losses, as 
losses to the air and partly to the ground are neglected. 
According to the studies of Brouwer et al. (1995) and Schleef and Kleinhan13 
(1994), the nitrogen losses from cereal farms are about one fourth of the losses 
compared to dairy farms. The nutrient balances from poultry and pig farms 
show the highest nutrient losses. 
The magnitude of nutrient losses to the environment varies between coun-
tries and within countries. For example, in the Netherlands the nitrogen losses 
per hectare of arable land are, on average, almost three times higher than in 
Germany, and six times higher than in Finland (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Nutrient surpluses in EU-12 in 1990/91 and in Finland 1991/94. 










In EU-12 there also occurs considerable regional variation, i.e. within coun-
tries, in the nutrient balances. The main reason for high nutrient losses stems 
from intensive animal husbandry, and thus from the use of manure. Large scale 
livestock farms, which rely on imported feeding stuffs, like many pig farms in 
the Netherlands, produce huge amounts of manure. Instead of being a valuable 
production input, manure has turned out to be a mere waste in many cases 
(Dietz 1992). 
Finnish nutrient balance calculations also point out that nutrient losses from 
the animal husbandry farms surpass those from the cereal farms (Lankoski 
1996). Regional variation in nutrient losses is related to animal density. In 
intensive mille production areas the nitrogen losses are the highest. Map in 
Figure 6 shows how the nitrogen surpluses have changed in Finland from 1991 
to 1994. 
Exceptional weather conditions, such as the drought in some parts of Finland 
in 1992, also lower the usage efficiency of nutrients. Phosphorous surpluses are 
fairly similar in ali parts of the country, and they have decreased in the past few 
years; which is a result of the decrease in the use of phosphorous fertilisers in 
general (Pirttijärvi 1996). 





> 71 kg/ha 
Figure 6. (Net) nitrogen surpluses in Finland in 1991 and 1994. Source: 
Pirttijärvi 1996. 
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OECD has done work on nutrient balances amongst the other 12 environ-
mental indicator areas (OECD 1997).8 
Figure 7 shows the Finnish nitrogen surpluses over an 13-year period ac-
cording to the OECD schematics. As can be seen in the figure, a downward 
trend takes place in the nitrogen surplus during this period. The slope of the 
regression curve estimated from the series and shown in the figure is -3.0, i.e. 
nitrogen surplus per hectare is decreasing, on average, close to 3 kg/ha per year, 
although in the last few years there has been an upward trend. The same kind of 
trend is taking place in most other OECD countries (OECD 1997). 
Another evident feature in the chart is that the year 1987 has a considerable 
deviation from the trend line (this, in part, makes the regression line steeper). 
This is due to the unfavourable weather conditions for crop growth during that 
year. Nitrogen application via fertiliser and manure were about the same as in 
1986, but the uptake of nitrogen by the crops was about 30% lower. Therefore, 
the nitrogen surplus in 1987 was almost 20 kg/ha higher than in 1986. 
Figure 7. Nitrogen surplus and its trend in Finland in 1985-1995. 
8 The method used in OECD calculations is the surface balance method taking into account 
ammonia losses from manure which take place before spreading. The other indicator areas are: 
agricultural pesticide use, agricultural water use, agricultural land use and conservation, 
agricultural soil quality, agriculture and water quality, agricultural greenhouse gases, agricul-
ture and biodiversity, agriculture and wildlife habitats, agricultural landscape, farm manage-
ment, farm financial resources, and socio-cultural issues in relation to agriculture. 
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At the policy level this lcind of weather-influenced deviation in nutrient 
losses has important implications. For example, if there had been a policy 
measure established in 1986 with the objective of reducing the nitrogen surplus, 
the 1987 balance figure could have been incorrectly interpreted as an indication 
of policy failure. This is very important to note in international context where 
uniform policies are often sought for, and national characteristics are often not 
fully understood. 
This type of problem could be avoided by calculating, for example, three-
year moving averages, but then the effect of a particular policy becomes diffi-
cult to pinpoint as the impact of a policy measure is smoothened. Alternatively, 
some sort of `tolerance limits' for the random factor in the nutrient surplus 
could be introduced. However, there is no unambiguous way for setting the 
tolerance limits as the annual changes can be considerable. And, if the tolerance 
gap is too wide, again, the effect of a policy measure will be shadowed. This 
phenomenon will be discussed later in Section 4.1. in the context of nonpoint 
pollution. 
In the Finnish pork production some 500 farms are involved in the produc-
tion planning of the Centre of Rural Advisory Services (MKL). In the MKL 
production supervising system nutrient balances have also been calculated since 
1995 (Helander 1996). The relationship between the production costs and utili-
sation percentage of nutrients is illustrated in Figure 8. 
Figure 8. The relationship between production costs and nutrient utilisation at 
Finnish combination pork farms in 1995. Source: Helander (1996). 
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The nutrient balance calculated using the MKL data depicts the relationship 
between the nutrients entering the herd and exiting it in the form of meat (i.e. 
the cattle balance of nutrients). There is a positive correlation between nutrient 
utilisation and production costs; in other words, the lower the production costs 
are the better the farm' s utilisation of nutrients is. This demonstrates a link 
between good farm management and good environmental management, although 
this relationship is not very clearly pronounced. 
In the Finnish pork production the average utilisation percentage for nitrogen 
is 35 and for phosphorous 28 (Helander 1996). In cattle production the corre-
sponding figures on farms participating in the production supervision in 1996 
were 24% for nitrogen and 31% for phosphorus. The average nutrient surpluses 
by cattle balances were 114 kg of nitrogen and 15 kg of phosphorous per animal 
per year (Mälkiä 1997). 
2.4. Nutrient balances as policy tools 
In addition to the information dimension of the indicator, the NBCs are being 
applied in environmental control policies, too. The Netherlands (together with 
Denmark) is the pioneer in taking advantage of the NBCs in agri-environmental 
policy. In 1998 a new manure law based on a levy system on farm level nutrient 
surpluses will come into force (MLNV 1995). The main principle of the law 
will be a levy on surplus phosphate on farms having more than 2.5 livestock 
units (LU) per hectare (in 2002 this will be lowered to 2.0 LU/ha). table b 
presents the contents of the manure law. The farm will be charged for the part of 
the phosphate surplus which exceeds a threshold value of 40 kg/ha in 1998. 
Later, the threshold levels will become stricter. Two levels of levies will be 
introduced; a lower 5 NLG/P205 kg and a higher 20 NLG/P205 kg, depending 
on the magnitude of the surplus9. Furthermore, nitrogen balances are intro-
duced, but no levies for them are set. Nitrogen surpluses are controlled indi-
rectly with the phosphate levy system. 
It is estimated that the average income losses in the year 2000 will be on pig 
farms NLG 7,000 and NLG 1,000 on cattle farms. At the beginning, about 50% 
of the farms will face the levies, and later, as the threshold levels will be 
lowered, almost every livestock farm will be covered by the levy system. In the 
short run, this system will not completely solve the country' s manure and nitrate 
problem, but yet it is a serious attempt to tackle the most serious problem of the 
Dutch agriculture. 
9  1 NLG (Dutch guilder) = 0.52 USD in mid 1998. Taking an example, a 50 hectar farm which 
has a 55 kg/ha phosphate surplus will in 1998 have to pay a levy of about NLG 7,500 levy 
(USD 3,870 or FIM 20,400). 
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Table 2. The thresholds of phosphate surpluses and spreading norms in the 
Netherlands. Source: MLNV 1995. 
1998 2000 2002 2005 2008/10 
Allowed surplus, P205 kg/ha 40 35 30 25 20 
Low P205 -levy, 5 NLG/kg 40-50 35-45 30-40 25-30 (1) 
High P205 -levy, 20 NLG/kg over 50 over 45 over 40 over 30 (1) 
Nitrogen surplus* 300 275 250 200 180 
Spreading norm, P205 kg/ha 85 80 80 80 
for grass 120 
for grain 100 
Livestock unit density per hectare 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.0 (1) 
* for grass; nitrogen deposition and mineralisation are not included. 
(1) will be decided later. 
The development of the NBCs as policy tools has also created research on 
their use as policy tools. For example, Berentsen and Giessen (1993) studied the 
efficacy of a control policy based on the NBCs. They present an agri-environ-
mental linear programming model for dairy farms. They consider four different 
policies (Table 3) available to reduce nitrate emissions on three different farms. 
As this research was conducted before the introduction of the manure law, 
the limits (e.g. 400 kg/ha N-surplus) do not correspond with the criteria in the 
forthcoming legislation. Yet, some useful information is gained here. From the 
table above it becomes clear that the different policy instruments work better on 
different goals. If the objective is the redu- ction of NH3 emissions, it is obvious 
that the policy involving closed manure storage coupled with injection of ma-
nure to the soil is by far the least-cost policy. However, concerning the reduc-
tion of other N-losses, the levy on nitrogen losses (calculated by the nutrient 
balance) appears to be the most cost-effective policy, although the results are to 
some extent ambiguous in this respect. 
Fontein et al. (1994) developed an econometric dual-approach model on the 
Dutch pig sector to assess how levy systems (on feed or on surplus) would 
reduce nitrogen surpluses. They conclude that a levy on the surplus of nitrogen 
is a more cost-effective way to reduce the output of nitrogen than a levy on feed. 
In the case of a levy on feed the profit reduction associated with a 40% reduc-
tion in the nitrogen excretion is larger than in the case of a levy on the surplus. 
The technical and environmental efficiency of Dutch dairy farms was stud-
ied by Reinhard et al. (1997). They concluded that, although the technical effi-
ciency was very high (0.89), the environmental efficiency measured by nitrogen 
surplus was fairly low (0.38). Their data also shows that intensive farms are 
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legal 	levy on 	levy on 
N-limit fertiliser-N N-losses 
	
(400 kg/ (NLG 4/ 	(NLG 4/ 
ha) 	kg) kg) 
Net decrease of labour 1 2,299 0 1,589 890 
income (NLG.): 2 2,694 5,730 6,881 8,006 
3 3,433 13,910 10,830 7,759 
Reduction of NH3-emission (kg N/ha): 1 7.4 0 1.5 1.4 
2 18 16 16 18 
3 29 36 32 31 
Decrease of income/kg reduction 1 13 44 26.5 
of NH3 (NLG/kg): 2 6.2 14.9 17.9 18.5 
3 4.9 16.1 14.1 10.4 
Reduction of other N-losses (kg/ha): 1 0 0 42 40 
2 0 112 114 130 
3 0 267 245 221 
Decrease of income/kg reduction 1 1.6 0.9 
of other N-losses (NLG/kg): 2 2.1 2.5 2.5 
3 2.2 1.8 1.5 
environmentally more efficient than extensive farms with respect to the genera-
tion of nitrogen surplus, although this tendency is not very pronounced. 
In Finland Lankoski (1996) has studied the cost-efficiency of a nitrogen 
fertiliser tax compared to an effluent tax based on nutrient balances. The cost-
efficiency of a direct instrument, effluent tax, was better at lower abatement 
levels (i.e. at 10% - 30% abatement levels). However, at higher abatement lev-
els the tax on nitrogen input was more cost-effective. If nitrogen surpluses are 
high, taxing inputs is a more cost-effective policy. 
The nutrient balance calculations are beginning to he used in agri-environ-
mental policy. However, so far there is little evidence to support the NBCs-
based levies as a more effective policy choice over the conventional input or 
output taxes. The relative superiority of a policy instrument depends on differ-
ent factors, such as the expected and realised costs functions (see Section 3.3.). 
This leads us to the question: How reliable is the methodological base of the 
NBCs? The policy evaluation is biased in cases where the expected and the 
realised costs and benefits differ. The following section underlines some prob-
lems that hinder the use of the NBCs both for farm level assessment and in 
policy analyses. 
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2.5. Inherent problems of the nutrient balance calculations 
Even though the nutrient balance calculations seem to be a very attractive way 
of circumventing the nonpoint pollution problem, thus allowing the policymaker 
to use economic instruments such as levies on nutrient surpluses (as in the 
Dutch case), some inherent limitations still exist. These limitations can be 
calculation specific, information specific, or application specific. 
The calculation specific problems are those related to the data accuracy and 
to the components which need to be included in the calculation. For example, a 
set of coefficients must be used in calculating the nutrient contents in the 
manure and in the harvested crops. Expressing unequivocal nutrient coefficients 
for the nutrient content in manure for different livestock is a difficult task. 
Yearly changes, as well as regional or international differences, can be consid-
erable. Much of the magnitude of the coefficients depends on the feeding 
process, and on the efficiency of the animals to process their feed. The same 
kind of variation, but to a lesser extent, is present in the nutrient uptake coeffi-
cients of different crops. 
The biological nitrogen fixation is the cornerstone of nutrient economy in 
organic farming, but, in most cases, it bears negligible meaning in conventional 
farming. In addition, nitrogen deposition can be as high as 35-40 kg/ha in 
Central Europe, but in Portugal or in Finland it remains in the range of 5 kg/ha 
(Brouwer et al. 1995, Ympäristö 1997). Thus, the type of farming as well as 
local conditions must be kept in mind when assessing the relevance of the 
factors to be included in the NBCs. 
One of the major questions concerning the feasibility of nutrient balances in 
poficy use is the problem of external factors, such as the weather and soil type, 
that influence the build-up of the surplus. Because of the weather, yield levels 
from year to year yary considerably in Finland which is located at the margin of 
cultivation for many crops. The question of how important a role the weather 
has on the build-up of nutrient surpluses is studied in more detail in Chapter 5. 
In some of the NBCs (e.g. Brouwer et al. 1995 and Schleef and Kleinhan13 
1994), 30% of the nitrogen of manure is subtracted to derive the net surface 
balance, as explained in Section 2.2.1. Calculating the net surface balance of 
nitrogen levels out the differences of the nutrient usage efficiency between 
cereal farms and animal husbandry farms. The net balance is more closely 
related to the problem of nitrogen losses to watercourses. This approach, though, 
distorts the real problem of agricultural nutrient losses, as losses into the air and 
partly to the soil are ignored. At farm level the `evaporation percentage' may 
well be quite something else than 30% due to differences in production tech-
niques. 
The NBCs also contain information specific problems. In general, nutrient 
balances are not very useful indicators unless related to the agricultural land 
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area, number of livestock units, or the total input of nutrients, for example. In 
the international context the choice of the elements in the denominator plays an 
important role. If ali possible agricultural land is added to the denominator, the 
balance per hectare gets smaller (i.e. we get a more favourable figure). Indeed, it 
would be better to consider only the active arable land area (where manure or 
fertilisers are spread) in the agricultural land area to produce more meaningful 
figures. 
Furthermore, we have to note that the NBCs do not indicate very precisely 
where the nutrient emission occurs, i.e. to what extent the losses leach to 
watercourses or discharge into the air. Therefore, nutrient surplus is more of an 
indicator than an exact measure of nutrient emissions. Substantial nutrient sur-
pluses tell the farmer that there is an efficiency problem in using the inputs at 
his disposal; and that there is also an environmental problem. The farmer then 
faces a number of options for reducing nutrient losses. From this perspective, 
the NBCs can be seen as an information tool in the production planning. 
The NBCs alone usually convey insufficient information to the farmer in 
terms of what to do and how to improve the nutrient utilisation on the farm. 
Therefore, the balance sheet should be closely integrated to other farm planning 
and monitoring procedures. As a result, nutrient balances will influence the 
farmer to choose environmentally sound management practices; and, thus, the 
NBCs work as an information policy instrument. 
The question concerning the purpose of the actual use of the NBCs falls into 
to the set of application specific problems. The NBCs can be used for different 
purposes, and it is the purpose that justifies the way of calculating the balance. 
That is, there is no single correct way to do the calculation. If the NBCs are used 
only as a production planning tool in the farm management, the completeness 
and use of the best estimates is more important than strict administrative compa-
rability, as put forward by Lord and Anthony (1997). 
However, if we need to get comparable figures, the definitions of the calcu-
lation methods must be set so that the database is consistent and the coefficients 
are derived using consistent methods. This is the basis for the work the OECD 
(1997) and Eurostat (1997) are doing for their parts. Indeed, we have to be very 
careful in interpreting the results if different methods are used. 
In administrative use the balance calculations face the reliability bias due to 
farmers' strategic behaviour. If farmers know that the NBCs are to be used, for 
example, for setting a levy based on the nutrient surplus, they tend to overesti-
mate the quantity of outputs and underestimate the quantity of inputs. This is a 
hidden information setting, and will easily lead to adverse selection (see Section 
4.). The enforcement costs for policymaker to verify the NBCs' information, 
e.g. using the information from the taxation database, will not be insignificant. 
Hence, the actual use of the nutrient balance calculations also influences the 
accuracy of the data. If farmers consider that the NBCs provide them with new 
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and valuable information they have an incentive to report the balance sheet as 
accurately as possible. But if they fear they are to be penalised by the outcome 
of the calculation, they have an incentive to report less reliably. This is an issue 
that needs to be taken into consideration in the final policy analysis. 
2.6. The framework of the study 
The theoretical framework of this study is presented in Figure 9. As noted in the 
previous sections, producing agricultural commodities has negative effects on 
the environment, along with the positive ones. However, the market mechanism 
lacks the ability to capture these effects because most of the environmental 
goods are public goods, the use of which is nonexclusive and nonrival. The task 
is, consequently, to define agri-environmental policy instruments to internalise 
these effects in such a way that social welfare is maximised (or improved). 
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Figure 9. Theoretical framework of the study. 
32 
When economists are talking about control policies they usually mean the 
principal-agent approach (Siebert 1995). This means that the policymaker, the 
government (in a usual ca' se) as the principal is seen to be the authority reflect-
ing the people' s view on the desired environmental quality, and it sets specific 
quality goals for it. The principal attempts to influence the decisions of the 
agents, e.g. the farmers, in such a way that the target is eventually reached. 
Thus, the task for the principal is to design such policy instruments (i.e. institu-
tional arrangements and/or incentives) which make individual agents' behaviour 
contribute according to the specified overall target. 
The principal usually sets taxes or standards on inputs or emissions to make 
the marginal private benefits meet the marginal social cost. However, emission-
based first-best solutions are seldom possible in agricultural pollution control 
due to its nonpoint nature. In nonpoint pollution problems, the monitoring of 
individual polluting actions is difficult and such actions cannot usually be 
inferred from observed ambient pollution because of the following two reasons 
(Segerson 1988, Helfand and House 1995): 
ambient pollutant levels have a random distribution that is con-
tingent on the level of abatement undertaken; and/or 
the actions of several polluters contribute to the ambient levels 
and only combined effects are observable 
Because of these reasons, the solutions to control point source pollution 
problems do not work in the case of NPP. Therefore, workable policy instru-
ments for NPP must recognise these characteristics. 
In addition to the nonpoint problem of agricultural emissions, there exists 
another problem that makes agri-environmental policy formulation difficult. 
The weather is an especially important factor influencing the growth of crops in 
Finland. Therefore, emissions from the agricultural sector can be very extensive 
if the growing conditions are unfavourable, resulting in inefficient nutrient 
utilisation. The effects of weather factors on nutrient surpluses are studied using 
data from the research stations of the Agricultural Research Centre. A second 
set of data is from dairy farms in Eastern Finland. This latter data is used in 
assessing the relationship between farm economic factors and nutrient use effi-
ciency. 
The information from crop level data is incorporated into farm-models to 
assess agri-environmental policy formulation. A cost-efficiency model for si-
lage production is constructed. In the final policy assessment one important 
factor to be taken into consideration is how well the system dispatches informa-
tion and whether this has an effect on the policy ranking, i.e. information is in a 
key role when assessing policy alternatives. 
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3. Producing agricultural goods and bads 
3.1. Producing agricultural commodities 
As discussed earlier, agricultural production has manifold impacts on the envi-
ronment. To be able to assess the economic implications of these impacts we 
have to inspect the production economics of the agricultural production process. 
Production is an activity of combining and using goods and services called 
inputs in a technological process to produce goods and services called outputs 
(Gravelle and Rees 1990). These goods are used privately or sold on the mar-
kets. By definition, trade is an exchange process of goods and services (both 
inputs and outputs) on the markets. 
The neoclassical approach of economics, which is used in this study, sees 
agriultural producer to toil on his (or her) farm aiming at profit maximisation 
(alternatively, he can also aim at rninimising costs). The profit is the difference 
between the production costs and the price farmer gets for the outputs sold from 
the farm. Of course, the profit maximising approach can (and should) be ques-
tioned and criticised. Ritson (1985) clarifies this issue stating that we are con-
cerned with what happens instead of what should happen — whether or not it is 
in the `society's interest' . Profit maximising approach is a hypothesis concern-
ing the behaviour of a farm firm. Based on this, we can identify changes in the 
marginal costs and revenues when a change takes place e.g. in the prices of the 
inputs the farm uses in its production process. 
According to Ritson (1985), the four main factors affecting the change in the 
firm's supply of agricultural outputs are: the state of technology, the price of a 
product, the price of competing products, and the price of inputs. A change in 
any of these will have an effect on the farm profit. In policy analyses, simulations 
are made to estimate the magnitude of the profit change when one or more of 
these four factors are allowed to vary. The following example clarifies the issue. 
In Figure 10, the TC1 curve indicates the total costs of producing Product A 
before the price change of the input. The profit is indicated by the difference of 
total revenue and total cost, i.e. TR - TC1. The corresponding marginal costs 
curve is MC1, and the maximum profit level of Product A is Q1, i.e. at the point 
where marginal cost and marginal return (MR) meet. 
If a price change, e.g. of fertilisers, takes place, the total cost curve of an 
agricultural commodity, ceteris paribus, shifts to the left, i.e. from TC1 to TC2. 
This means that if the policymaker wants to set a tax on fertilising inputs when 
hoping to reduce agricultural nutrient runoffs, the total costs of producing any 
given level of Product A will rise. In addition, since the quantity of fertilisers 
used decreases along with the level of output, the rise in the total cost will itself 
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Figure 10. The effect of a price change on production. Source: Ritson (1985). 
any level of Product A also rises, i.e. MC1 shifts to MC2, and the maximum 
profit levels of the production of Product A will move from Q1 to Q2 (Figure 10b). 
Thus, an increase in the price of one input, other things remaining unaltered, 
will cause a decrease in supply. 
The effects of technology change, output price change, and change in the 
price of competing products can be analysed in the same way. For example, 
productivity improvement due to technical innovation will result in a decrease 
in total costs. Further, a fall in the price of a competing product will cause a rise 
in supply. Finally, the change in the price of a product shifts the total revenue 
line. A rise in the product price increases the quantity of Product A produced, 
i.e. the farm is willing to supply more of a good when the price of it increases. 
The responsiveness of the quantity suppfied to changes in the price of a product 
is called the price elasticity of supply. More formally, Es = (3Q/Q)/(SP/P). 
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Let us now look at a situation where a farm produces one crop using two 
inputs, e.g. mineral fertiliser and manure, in its production process. Following 
Debertin (1986) we get; 
2r pf (x f ,x„,)— w f x f — wni xm 
where 	r = profit 
p 	= price of output 
f(x) = production function 
x 	= quantity of nitrogen fertiliser input in fertiliser 
Xm = quantity of nitrogen fertiliser input in manure 
wf = price of nitrogen fertiliser 
w 	= price of nitrogen in manure 
To find an optimal solution to this maximisation problem the equation is 
differentiated first with respect to xf and then to 	to get the two first order 
conditions, i.e.: 
= Pf ( X f )- Wf ; and 
7r 2 = Pf (Xm Wm 
setting these to zero and rewriting: 
f(x f )=w f I p=x* f  
f (x.) = wm I p = x*„, 
These mean that when the profit is at the maximum, the marginal product 
equals the ratio between the input price and output price. The sufficient second 
order conditions to ensure a local maximum for the concave production function 
are: 
827r / Sx f äx f <0 
327 / Sx.5.7cm <0 
((57r I Sx f )(Sz I 3x.) — (87r 8,y f Sx.)2 >0 
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However, the production process is usually more complex, because in this 
setting the production is assumed to have no external effects either on the 
environment or on the utility of some other producer or consumer. Usually these 
effects exist, i.e. the production creates externalities. 
3.2. External effects of agricultural production 
3.2.1. Externalities and market failure 
As stated above, the aim of a producer in his production process is to create 
goods for consumption either for his own use or to other people' s use through 
the markets. The rules of thermodynamics, however, dictate that it is inevitable 
to lose some input flow along the production process (even if this is actually not 
lost here). A classic example of this is pollution, e.g. nutrient runoffs from 
agricultural fertilisers. Therefore, pollution is not merely a symptom of a market 
failure, but a pervasive phenomenon in itself. This viewpoint is called a inateri-
als balance approach (Pearce and Turner 1990, Siebert 1995). Market failure 
exists when markets are not maximising the social welfare. In this context, 
economists usually talk about production (or consumption) externalitiesl°, which 
exist when an activity of one agent causes an uncompensated change in some 
other agent's welfare. 
In an economy of two activities i and j, externality exists if the output Q  in 
activity i depends on the output Q or on the inputs R of the other activity 
(Siebert 1995). Thus; 
(9) 	 =Fi(Rig,R;) 
where 	 ök2 I öQ j 0 or (5Q1 I öRi 0 
It must be noted here that the output i often decreases when facing externali-
ties, but it can also increase. If the output of good i increases while the output of 
good j is rising, positive externalities exist. Similarly, if the output of good i 
decreases while the output of good j is rising, negative externalities will prevail. 
Therefore, we can also talk about positive externalities; not only the negative 
ones. 
10 Vatn and Bromley (1997) redefine the existence of externalities from a different viewpoint as; 
"given the markets, the presence of externalities can be interpreted as a rational result and thus 
cannot properly be called a `failure' of the market". 
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But why do we seldom encounter positive externalities? The answer is 
simple: if somebody creates a positive externality, he tries to sell it (in case he 
has the property right on the externality, see next section) to the person who 
benefits from it, and we are talking about ordinary goods sold on market. On the 
other hand, the producer has a tendency to neglect the negative externalities, 
because taking care of them (pollution abatement) imposes additional costs to 
the production. 
At the competitive markets the producer finds the equilibrium between sup-
ply and demand at the point where his marginal private costs equal the marginal 
private benefits. In the case of externalities, the producer's supply curve does 
not reflect marginal social costs which exceed the marginal private costs. This 
will entail excessive production of the commodity, and too much pollution is 
produced. 
If the environmental effects of the production are taken into account, the 
emissions can be considered to be joint outputs of the production, which are 
then emitted to the environment. Then, the emission function (E) can be written 
as; 
= Hi (Qi ),Hi f > 0, Hi" > 0 
This emission function assumes that, at a given technology, the quantity of 
emissions increases proportionally or progressively along with output Q,, but it 
excludes the case in which the quantity of pollutants increases regressively 
(Siebert 1995). If 	= 0, the emission function is a linear curve, and if " > 0, 
the emission function is strictly convex. 
The production function Q,  is characterised by a declining marginal product 
and does not distinguish among different production factors. For simplicity, 
only one type of resource R is assumed (instead of having manure and fertiliser 
as in Equation (1). 
= Fi (Ri ),Fi' > 0, Fi" <0 
Compiling these two equations above the emission function is rewritten to; 
E, 
This function defines the statement that the pollutants are joint products of 
the input. Overuse of inputs, and consequently environmental deterioration, is 
one symptom of the failure of the market system to internalise the external 
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effects agriculture has on the environment. From the social point of view agri-
culture produces too much pollution (e.g. nutrient runoffs) since it ignores the 
impact the pollution has on the environment (e.g. on watercourses). 
3.2.2. Public goods and property rights 
According to a definition by Randall (1987), environmental goods, such as 
environmental quality, are public goods which are nonexclusive and nonrival. 
The definition nonexclusive means that the users of the environment cannot be 
prevented from benefiting" from the public good in question. Nonrivarly means 
that benefiting or consuming of the public good does not reduce the possibility 
for someone else to use the public good. In practise, the consumption of a public 
good can to some extent have an effect on the quantity of the supply available to 
somebody else if congestion of the public good takes place. 
As environmental quality is a public good, farmers using nitrogen fertilisers 
cause nitrate pollution of watercourses because the price charged for the ferti-
liser usually does not reflect the cost of water pollution to the society (OECD 
1994). Therefore, market mechanisms do not capture the external effects of the 
production if no one owns (exclusively) the right to use the environment and no 
one claims for compensation based on these harmful effects, i.e. the property 
rights of the environment are inadequately defined. 
In general, environmental externalities can emerge because of failures in the 
property rights system (Hanley 1991). Property rights are a set of rules (rights, 
privileges and limitations) which specify the use of scarce resources and goods. 
It is the right to use a resource that property rights relate to (Pearce and Turner 
1990). Tietenberg (1992) defines four characteristics for an efficient structure 
of property rights; universality, exclusivity, transferability, and enforceability. 
As long as property rights are well defined, trade between agents will result in 
an efficient allocation of externality (Varian 1990). However, problems arise 
when one tries to define property rights for public goods, such as the environ-
ment. Siebert (1995) presents two approaches to the environmental problem; the 
public-goods approach and the property-rights approach. 
The public-goods approach states that, if environmental quality is a public 
good, property rights cannot be defined and government intervention becomes 
necessary. This approach claims that, if property rights are adequately defined, 
optimal allocation will be reached through private decisions, and government 
intervention becomes necessary only in order to define and secure property 
rights. 
11  Of course, somebody can also feel the environment to reduce his utility, and thus considers the 
environment to be a negative externality, i.e. a `public bad', for himself. 
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The public-goods approach requires assessment of environmental quality in 
order to attain the govemment goal of welfare maximisation. Environmental 
quality can be assessed using different methods, like the travel cost method, 
hedonic pricing, or contingent valuation method. The approach sees the social 
welfare function as reflecting the benefits and costs of environmental quality. 
The social welfare function is thus a guideline for benefit-cost analysis. 
The property-rights approach can be interpreted as a contribution to the 
theory of institutions, where an institution is defined as a set of mies that 
specify how things are done in a society (Siebert 1995). If institutions cannot 
define the property rights for the use of the environment in agricultural prac-
tices, and the cost of using fertilisers does not reflect its social cost, farmers 
have an incentive to overuse fertilisers relative to the community' s net interest 
(OECD 1994). Thus, if property rights are well established, the market will find 
the correct allocation of resources e.g. by negotiating over the compensation the 
externality creates to the property right holder. 
3.3. Internalising the externalities 
What are the solutions to the externality problems? For the economists pollution 
is an extemal cost, which occurs only when one or more individuals suffer a 
loss of welfare. The neoclassical solution is to find (or at least move towards) a 
Pareto-opiimum of society, i.e. a situation where there is no altemative alloca-
tion of resources that leaves everyone at least as well off and makes some 
people strictly better off (Varian 1990). Thus, a Pareto-inefficient situation 
occurs when there exists some way to make somebody better off without hurting 
anyone else. In theory, the Pareto-optimum is reached, at the competitive mar-
kets, when the marginal social costs are set equal to marginal private benefits. 
This will yield the optimal level of pollution. 
We have two approaches to find the optimal solution to externality problem: 
taxes and standards, and Coase solution. These also reflect the public-goods 
approach and property-rights approach. 
Taxes and standards 
In the idealistic economic environment of prefect information, choosing be-
tween a tax and a quota system (or market permit) is indifferent from the 
polluter' s viewpoint. This can be seen in Figure 11, which depicts the situation 
in a simple way. The horizontal axis describes the level of reduction in the 
emissions, and the vertical axis the costs and benefits of an activity. The origin 
represents the zero level of abatement (no emissions reduction). The upward 
sloping curve represents marginal social costs (MSC) of pollution. The positive 
slope of the curve is logical, as the costs of pollution reduction are likely to 
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MSB 
increase when we approach the level of zero emissions. The downward sloping 
curve of marginal social benefits (MSB) is also presented in the figure. The 
negative sign of the MSB curve is also obvious, because the further we reduce 
the emissions the smaller is the marginal benefit of an incremental emission 
decrease. 
The optimal point of emission reduction is at E, where the marginal benefits 
and costs are equal. This point can be reached in two ways; first, by setting a 
tax T upon each unit of emissions, or second, by setting a quantity level to 
emissions at Q. Both approaches result to the same optimal outcome (Baumol 
and Oates 1988). This analysis relies on perfect information on the cost and 
benefit curves. However, in reality the situation is usually not that simple. 
Simultaneous uncertainty concerning marginal costs and marginal benefits 
makes the policy choice more complex. In the presence of uncertainty, the 
expected value of social welfare can differ significantly between the price vs. 
quantities control systems. When the regulator is unaware of the true position of 
the cost and/or benefit curves, the policy will, in general, differ from optimal 
(Baumol and Oates 1988). 
However, benefit uncertainty on its own does not have an effect on the 
optimal control instrument (Weitzman 1974). Thus, it is important to know that 
uncertainty on the location of the MSB curve only does not affect the choice of 
the instrument, as equilibrium prices and costs depend exclusively on the cost 
function. If marginal benefits are fairly constant over the relevant range of waste 
emissions, the tax on emissions will provide close to the right signal as a 
measure of external costs (Baumol and Oates 1988). A more formal account of 





Figure 11. Marginal costs and benefits in pollution abatement. 
41 
Coase solution 
Coase (1960, ref. Siebert 1995) has presented an alternative solution to optimal 
environmental allocation; 
"Let exclusive property titles to the environment be defined, and let them 
be transferable. Let there be no transaction costs. Let individuals maxim-
ise their utilities, and let them be nonaltruistic. Then a bargaining solution 
among different users of the environment will result in a Pareto-optimal 
solution among different users of the environment. The resulting alloca-
tion is independent of the initial distribution of property titles." 
Coase pointed out that pollution control situations have a certain symmetry. 
Inefficient pollution imposes costs on victims which exceed the costs of control-
ling the pollution in question. In other words, the marginal benefits of pollution 
control exceed the marginal costs. The existence of inefficient pollution damage 
therefore provides a motivation for the victims to take corrective action even in 
the absence of any such incentives by the polluters (Tietenberg 1997). 
Thus, if property rights are well established, regardless of who holds the 
property rights, there is a tendency to approach the social optimum (Pearce and 
Turner 1990). Therefore there is no need for government intervention, for the 
market will take care of the internalising of the externality. However, many 
problems undermine this theoretical approach, too. 
For one, transaction costs, such as bringing involved parties together and the 
actual bargaining, are not likely to be zero. Further, negotiation is difficult to 
apply when the number of people affected by the externality is large (i.e. the 
free riding problem may arise). 
Coase theorem assumes perfect competition where marginal net private ben-
efits equal price minus marginal costs (i.e. MNPB = P - MC). Under imperfect 
competition, however, the optimal level of externality is achieved when mar-
ginal net private benefits equal the marginal revenue minus marginal costs (i.e. 
MNPB = MR - MC). Clearly, marginal revenue does not in this case equal the 
price because the demand curve is above the marginal revenue curve. Therefore, 
bargaining solution does not apply under imperfect competition (Pearce and 
Turner 1990). These may be some of the reasons why government intervention 
is likely to happen in policies aiming to internalise the environmental externali-
ties. 
In practise, environmental control policies are implemented through differ-
ent policy instruments which will be discussed in the next chapter. However, 
before scrutinising the policy instruments we need to look at the nonpoint 
pollution characteristics of agricultural pollution. These characteristics have to 
be understood before applying policy instruments to the agricultural production 
process. 
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4. Control of agricultural pollution 
4.1. Characteristics of nonpoint pollution 
Nonpoint pollution (NPP) (or dispersed pollution) is defined as sources of water 
pollution not associated with a distinct discharge source. These include rainwa-
ter, erosion, runoff from roads, farms, and parking lots, and seepage from soil-
based wastewater disposal systems. In comparison, point pollution (PP) is de-
fined as a specific discharge that is traceable to a distinct source (i.e. pipe, ditch, 
container, or well.) such as discharge from wastewater treatment plants or 
industrial facilities (Cox et al. 1996). The presence of NPP can be indicated by 
measures concerning the water quality. 
The nutrient runoffs from arable land are nonpoint pollution since the exact 
origin of these discharges is difficult (or even impossible) to define. Instead, 
runoffs from e.g. a farm' s manure storage facility are considered point pollution 
as these originate from a specific source. Therefore, agricultural production 
bears the characteristics of both the nonpoint and the point source pollution. 
However, it is primarily the NPP through arable faiming that is of interest here. 
The inherent problem with respect to agricultural nonpoint pollution is that 
the ambient pollutant levels from farming depend on a number of climatic and 
topographic conditions in a manner that cannot be predicted with certainty. This 
implies that there will be a range of possible ambient levels associated with any 
given abatement practice or discharge level at any given time (Segerson 1988). 
The range of possible ambient levels can be presented by a probability 
density function (PDF) that is conditional to the abatement practice. The usual 
objective of pollution control policies is to increase the probability that the 
ambient levels will fall below a certain tolerance level. This is presented in 
Figure 12, where the implementation of a certain policy measure causes the 
PDF° to shift to the left to the PDFI, and to a reduced level of ambient pollution. 
It must also be noted that, if the gap between the two PDFs is fairly narrow, 
i.e. the shift in the PDF°  is only marginal, it becomes difficult to conclude if the 
abatement policy has really had any effect on the pollution level. Thus, uncer-
tainty concerning the prevailing stochastic effects makes the policy assessment 
much more complex. 
In the context of agricultural nonpoint pollution, there are some information 
problems related to imperfect monitoring. According to Braden and Segerson 
(1993), these are: 1) the inability to observe emissions, 2) the inability to infer 
emissions from observable inputs, and 3) the inability to infer emissions from 
ambient environmental quality. The combination of these problems can hinder 
the design of efficient pollution control instrument, but this also makes the 
policy design very challenging. 
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Figure 12. Probability density functions in pollution abatement. Source: Segerson 
(1988). 
Shortle and Dunn (1991) give a useful presentation of the impact the weather 
has on the yield and consequently on the optimal fertilisation levels (Figure 13). 
They use a simple farm model where grain is produced, and the only factors 
having an influence on the crop yield are the weather and nitrogen application. 
The curve R represents the revenue from grain sales and nitrogen application if 
the weather conditions are good. Curve Rb  represents the situation in a bad year, 
and Re  represents the situation in a normal year. Cf is the cost curve of fertilis- 
ing. The dotted vertical Iines indicate the points where profit is maximised at a 
corresponding revenue expectation and fertiliser application, i.e. the distance 
between the revenue curve and cost line is at maximum. 
As the farmer is unable to foresee the weather in advance, he fertilises on the 
basis of what he expects to occur. If good and bad years are assumed to be 
equally likely, the expected revenue line Re is the one according to which the 
farmer acts. Thus, the farmer uses the amount of Ne of nitrogen to maximise the 
profit, which is the distance between the curves Re and Cf. 
However, if the weather turns out to be bad instead of the normal one, the - 
farmer over-fertilises by the difference between Ne- Nb. Furthermore, instead of 
getting the revenue of GB he gets EB, which is smaller than the optimal level 
DA in a bad year. Therefore, both the farmer and the environment lose in this 
setting. 
If the weather turns out to be better than expected, the farmer would have 
been better off using more fertilisers, i.e. up to Ng, since the profit JC is bigger 
than IB. However, the farmer will get an extra revenue of IG. The environmen-
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Figure 13. Profit maximising and optimal fertilisation levels. Source: Shortle 
and Dunn (1991). 
cient nutrient uptake by the crop, Thus, the stochastic nature of the weather has 
an effect on the farmer' s revenue, the crop response, as well as the nutrient 
emissions to the environment. Therefore the creation of policy instruments to 
tacIde these phenomena proves to be very challenging. 
4.2. Different ways to tackle the nonpoint pollution problem 
It is clear that the characteristics of nonpoint pollution challenge the policymaker 
much more than in the case of point pollution. Land use control as well as 
technology-based best management practices (BMPs) are the two most widely 
used tools for controlling NPP and protecting designated uses of watercourses. 
The BMPs are defined as a structural or non-structural method, activity, mainte-
nance procedure, or other management practice used singularly or in combina-
tion to reduce nonpoint source inputs to receiving waters in order to achieve 
water quality protection goals (Cox et al. 1996). Examples include animal waste 
management systems, conservation tillage systems, vegetated filter strips, ma-
nure and soil testing, following recommended manure and effluent application 
rates, and halting application of animal waste nutrients in winter months. Many 
of these measures are included in the present Finnish agri-environmental pro- 
gramme. 
However, as e.g. Segerson (1988) points out, the BMPs may not allow for 
flexibility and cost-minimising abatement strategies unless applied on a site-
specific basis. This is true also in the Finnish case. For example, the winter 
plant-cover criterion in Southern Finland is 30% regardless of the proximity to 
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the watercourses. Therefore, farms located further away from rivers or lakes are 
carrying the same burden set by the criterion in spite of their lower potential for 
nutrient leakage. Braden et al. (1989) also point out that spatially uniform 
policies lack the cost-efficiency characteristics. This means that more emphasis 
should be laid on constructing locally differentiated or flexible policies instead 
of uniform policies. The drawback of this may be that controlling and monitor-
ing costs become very high. 
Instead of the BMPs, different pollution control policies have been intro-
duced to tackle the NPP problem. The theoretical literature on controlling 
nonpoint pollution focuses on achieving optimal solutions (Helfand and House 
1995). The pioneering research on agricultural NPP focused on examining the 
efficiency of different policy instruments. Griffm and Bromley (1982) evaluated 
the effect of effluent instruments and input instruments. They found out that 
properly designed standards or incentive methods perform equally well under 
complete information. 
Shortle and Dunn (1986) examined the relative efficiency of different con-
trol strategies for achieving agricultural nonpoint pollution abatement under 
incomplete information. They concluded that appropriately specified manage-
ment practice incentives (MPIs) outperform incentives or standards based on 
runoff estimates. The MPIs have an intrinsic potential to induce farmers to 
allocate their production methods to maximise the expected social net benefits 
of their decisions. Shortle and Dunn also emphasise the information quality 
conveyed by the MPIs, because the MPIs permit the farmer to utilise the infor-
mational advantage about the alternative management practices to maximise his 
welfare. 
Furthermore, Shortle and Dunn suggest that when actual emissions cannot be 
measured, pollution should be monitored by controlling the use of inputs (i.e. 
the second-best solution). However, even though this method might reduce 
water pollution, it fails to incorporate potentially important and cost-effective 
abatement measures, such as improved management practices (Byström and 
Bromley 1996). 
Braden and Segerson (1993) present a model showing that in the presence of 
information problems (e.g. the measuring problems of nonpoint pollution), the 
use of multiple indirect instruments may promote efficiency. The use of multi-
ple instruments may be redundant in the world of first-best solutions of single 
instruments, but it may have an important role to play in improving efficiency 
when single instruments are imperfect. 
In addition, various other incentive schemes, such as suggested by Segerson 
(1988) or Xepapadeas (1992), are proposed for controlling the NPP. In these 
models it is the ambient concentration of the pollutants according to which the 
proper policy measures are set. The inconvenience of these is that each polluter 
pays a tax which is independent of his own contribution to ambient pollution. 
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To overcome this drawback, Romstad (1997) has presented an incentive scheme 
where e.g. taxes are linked to the ambient quality of watercourses and the 
solution relies on a local team response. In the solution by Romstad, each 
polluter (agent) has superior information relative to the policymaker (principal) 
regarding his own as well as other agents' emissions. Then, properly designed 
incentives induce the agents as a team to make a contract with the principal to 
approach the policy goals set by the principal. 
Another way to overcome the problem of ambient taxes is proposed by 
Xepapadeas (1997), who presents an incentive scheme where farmer is given a 
menu of tax schemes from which he can choose. The payments are not related to 
the deviations between desired and observed ambient pollution but instead 
relate to observed choices offarmers. This approach also relies on the asymme-
try of information to reach the optimal emission levels. Xepapadeas shows that 
when farmers differ with respect to their emission characteristics, ambient taxes 
can lead to a sub-optimal emission level compared with the socially optimal 
regulatory scheme. 
Thus, it seems that new and functioning (second-best) policy solutions to 
overcome the NPP problem of agriculture are emerging. Many of these solu-
tions involve a special attention to the quality of information. However, a way 
to totally circumvent the problem of agricultural nonpoint pollution exists. We 
need to approach the problem from a different perspective; and the proposed 
way to do is to use the nutrient balance calculations in assessing a farm' s 
nutrient loads. As described in Section 2.2. the environmental load of an indi-
vidual farm (or a larger agricultural system) can be assessed by means of a 
balance calculation of nutrients. Thus, by measuring the incoming and outgoing 
nutrients (e.g. N, P and K), and deriving the balance, the problem of nonpoint 
pollution is truncated into a point pollution problem, which facilitates the first- 
best policy instrument assessment. 
The NBCs yield farm-specific environmental discharges of different nutri- 
ents, and avoid the difficulties that obstruct the control of NPP. Of course, the 
nutrient balance calculations are not exempt from difficulties (as discussed in 
earlier sections), and they are by no means 'the only right way' to address the 
nonpoint pollution problems, yet they offer new possibilities to tackle the issue. 
4.3. Environmental control policies 
4.3.1. Overview of control policies 
Government (i.e. the principal) uses different environmental policy instruments 
to reach the environmental objectives. These instruments can be categorised in 
different ways. The traditional twofold way is to talk about the economic 
instruments and the direct regulations (sometimes referred to as command-and- 
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control instruments) (Russell and Powell 1996). Segerson (1990) defines the 
environmental control policies as incentive policies (economic) and regulatory 
policies. 
In this study the classic dual classification is extended by one more element, 
and the three-category definition recommended by the OECD (1994) is used: 
Economic instruments, sometimes referred to as market-based 
instruments 
Direct regulations, also known as legislative approach; and 
Information policy 
The role of the information policy is highlighted in the approach of the 
OECD. Tietenberg (1997) calls this the third wave in the pollution control 
policy. In the following sections these three categories are reviewed in more 
detail. However, this study does not scrutinise the two traditional categories of 
environmental policy instruments very thoroughly, as the reader will find ample 
literature on these elsewhere. 
4.3.2. Economic instruments 
According to Segerson (1990), economic instruments to control nonpoint pollu-
tion are policy tools which create financial ex ante (i.e. prohibitive) incentives 
for producers to contain effluent leakage. In a farming situation this means that 
a farmer adapts his production according to the financial incentive he encoun-
ters e.g. in the prices of the inputs. 
Economic instruments can be broadly defined as the policy measures that 
aim to achieve the environmental objectives through market-based measures. 
Market-based policies pursue to equalise the level of marginal costs of control 
among firms, rather than the level of control. These measures include: 1) charges 
or taxes, 2) tradable input quotas and emission permits, 3) direct payments, 4) 
environmental management agreements, 5) tax concessions, and 6) reassessing 
property rights (OECD 1994). 
The first item mentioned in the list above, charges or taxes, is perhaps the 
most advocated one by economists but the least desired by the property rights 
holders. Charges and taxes on emissions are in line with the Polluter Pays 
Principle (PPP), but they are difficult to set to the optimal level especially in the 
case of agricultural pollution (as will he discussed later in Section 4.5.). 
There are several reasons favouring the use of environmental taxes. Accord-
ing to EEA (1996), the first maun economic reason for using taxes in the envi-
ronmental policy is to bring the costs of pollution and other costs of using the 
environment into the prices of the goods and services produced by the economic 
activity. Further, an environmental tax provides an incentive to avoid the tax by 
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using (or generating less of) the substance being taxed. This notion leads to the 
'Porter hypothesis' which postulates that environmental regulation generates 
positive effects to firms' profits by inducing the firms to improve both their 
technical and environmental efficiency (see e.g. Hetemäki 1995). 
An environmental tax allows each polluter to decide whether it is cheaper to 
pay the tax or to reduce pollution. Those polluters who face the highest costs of 
pollution reduction will tend to pay more of the tax, while those facing low 
reduction costs will reduce pollution, instead. The costs of achieving any given 
level of overall pollution reduction through a tax will therefore be cheaper than 
through a regulation. Furthermore, taxes work as innovations mechanisms in 
encouraging to operationalise new techniques to pollution control. And lastly, 
taxes raise revenues of the government. Therefore, policymakers are eager to 
use this option. 
In both the emission permit and the tradable input quota systems a market 
for the right to use certain inputs or the emission levels is created. In the former 
case, the regulating authority allows only a certain level of pollutant emissions, 
and issues tradable permits for this amount (Pearce and Turner 1990). Tradability 
of pollution rights stems in essence from the Coase theorem, according to which 
the polluter and the victim negotiate over the compensation for the adverse 
effect the externality has on the other agent's welfare. Emission permits are 
already widely used e.g. in California in controlling sulphur emissions of indus-
tries. However, in the agricultural sector the adaptation of the emission permits 
has so far been very limited. 
In an input quota system there will also be an intrinsic incentive to limit the 
input use as farmers could sell unused permits to other farmers. However, the 
administrative costs, especially in case of the emission permits may become 
very high as agricultural emission levels are not easily measured. 
A policymaker can use direct payments in expressing its preferences con-
cerning the desired environmental goods it considers worthwhile. An evident 
shift towards this direction is taking place in the Finnish society. Finnish agri-
culture is seen not only as a producer of food fibre, but also as a producer of 
environmental goods, such as the agricultural countryside environment, ACE 
(Aakkula 1996). Because of this multifunctional character, agriculture plays a 
particularly important role in the economic life of rural areas. The Finnish agri-
environmental programme, according to the EU regulation 2078/92, can be seen 
as a way to produce environmental benefits. 
The FAEP also bears some characteristics of environmental management 
agreements. In order to be eligible for FAEP support the farmer is obliged to 
fulfil several criteria, such as meeting certain fertilising base levels and estab-
lishing buffer strips. 
Tax concessions can be used to encourage farmers to adopt particular farm-
ing practices to favour sustainable agriculture. This policy is similar to direct 
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payments, but does not have such a heavy administrative burden. Typically, tax 
concessions are used to encourage investments in environmental purposes. 
In many ways the problems related to pollution stem from the poorly or 
inadequately defined property rights. Therefore, reassigning property rights is 
one of the most central ways to tackle the problem. In the literature on environ-
mental economics the failure to define a `good' or a `non-attenuated' set of 
property rights is seen as the reason for the existence of externalities and a 
market failure in this respect (Randall 1987) (see Section 3.2.). 
The control measures based on economic instruments or regulations are 
often blind in taking into account the farm characteristics, i.e. they lack the site-
and time-specific qualities of good environmental control. For example, a tax on 
fertilisers treats ali farmers in the same way, even though the efficiency in the 
use of the input varies across the farms. In a situation involving two similar 
farms using the same amount of fertilisers on same crops but with different 
output levels, the farmer producing more efficiently pays the same amount of a 
tax as the other (more polluting) farmer. In addition, the least polluting crops are 
penalised more heavily than the crops from which the leaching is proportionally 
greater. 
4.3.3. Direct regulations 
Instead of market-based policy measures, legislative policies can be used in 
controlling agricultural pollution. It is the standards or regulations which have 
become the usual policies to control agricultural environmental pollution. For 
example, the nitrate directive of the EU (91/676/EEC) sets upper limits to 
nitrogen for fertilisation in order to secure proper drinking water quality. Regu-
lations concerning certain manure storage capacity or guidelines for the right 
manure spreading are often used in this context. 
Shortle and Dunn (1991) divide standards directed to reducing agricultural 
NPP into peiformance standards and design standards. Design standards are ex 
ante measures directed to the ways farmers produce agricultural commodities 
and manage their land. These can be considered the command-and-control 
policy instruments. Performance standards, on the other hand, are measures 
which use ex post information, e.g. the levels of chemical residues in water, to 
assess the environmental performance of the farm production. 
Regulations can take many different forms, such as environmental norms for 
effluent emissions for farms or standards for food safety, total ban on certain 
inputs (e.g. dangerous pesticides) or practices, land use planning controls, and 
in certain cases the public ownership of resources (OECD 1994). Regulation 
minimises the risks and uncertainty of an outcome and it can often be targeted 
more precisely than other measures. In the case of e.g. safeguarding a habitat of 
an endangered species it might be necessary to ban certain farming practices to 
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ensure the desired outcome. 
Direct regulations are often coupled with sanctions in case of violating the 
regulation. This leaves the polluter the option to continue polluting up to the 
limit where his marginal net benefits equal the expected fine charged for viola- 
tions. 
Although economic instruments will often be the preferred choice by gov-
ernments because of the extra costs involved in enforcing and monitoring direct 
regulations, direct regulations may be required to reinforce the effectiveness of 
economic instruments. 
In Finnish agriculture, direct regulations are closely knit into fabric of the 
Finnish agri-environmental programme. In order to be eligible for the FAEP a 
farmer has to fulfil several environmental criteria, e.g. the certain base level 
fertilising must be followed, stocking density must be below 1.5 lu/ha and 
buffer strips must be left on the sides of main ditches (MMM 1994). 
4.3.4. Information policy 
In many cases both an accented as well as exercised way to address the environ-
mental problems of agriculture is to apply information policies, sometimes also 
referred as moral suasion. Tamminen (1997) states that the main means to 
control agricultural pollution in Finland have, in fact, been the information 
policies. The concept 'information policy' is a somewhat nondescript expres- 
sion, and needs to be defined more precisely. 
The Finnish Environment Agency (SYKE 1995) defines the information 
policy as the set of public laws, regulations, and policies that encourage (or 
discourage) or regulate the creation, use, storage, and communication of infor-
mation. Different interest groups and govemmental or non-govemmental insti-
tutions are the main actors in executing and developing information policy 
measures. 
The OECD (1994) gives a brief explanation on the concept of information 
policy as a measure aiming at providing research and the establishment of 
technical indicators, a well as communication of information to farmers (exten-
sion, advisory and training) and to the society as a whole (education). Ali these 
will induce a voluntary change in the behaviour of the agent's production 
methods and techniques. 
In agri-environmental information policy the goal is to reduce pollution by 
producing and sharing relevant information on the impact the agriculture has on 
the environment, as well as on the ways to reduce this impact. Most often the 
information is produced by research workers; and their results are delivered to 
farmers by agricultural advisory services or through the administrative bodies. 
The objective is to influence the farmers' attitudes and values through these 
different channels. 
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Information policy is in practise used as a supplementary measure; i.e. it is 
used in connection with other policy measures. Of course, when a policymaker 
sets, for example, direct regulations it also has a certain information dimension 
in its message. However, information policy is starting to gain more importance 
as a policy measure in itself (Juntti 1995, Tamminen 1997). Citing Tietenberg 
(1997), this is called the third phase of pollution control policies (the other two 
being economic instruments and direct regulations). According to Shortle and 
Dunn (1991), economists have, so far, been rather dubious about the effective-
ness of voluntary control, except in certain individual cases. Yet, there seems to 
be new `faith' emerging for the relevance concerning information policies in 
pollution control. 
Usually, the starting point for this policy measure is the personal perception 
and realisation on the environmental matters and, through this, influencing the 
behaviour of an individual (SYKE 1995). In the Finnish agricultural sector it 
has mainly been the rural advisory centres which have carried out the informa-
tion sharing tasks, thus being a workhorse for implementing govemmental 
information policies. 
During the 1990s information policies in connection with the agri-environ-
mental issues have started to flourish. In 1991 the Centre for Rural Advisory 
Centres (in Finnish, MKL) made the environmental issues the main theme for 
the year through the `Our common environment' campaign. In 1993 the Minis-
try of Agriculture and Forestry prepared the 'Code of good agricultural prac-
tice' , which describes environmentally sustainable production methods for agri-
culture. The Code refers to such production methods and practices in which the 
coupling of benefits related to the environmental and production economics is 
sought for in line with the principles of sustainable development (MMM 1993). 
A control measure based solely on information policy does not work very 
well, if tangible or evident entrepreneurial or environmental benefit is missing 
for the farmer to he realised. Hence, if the farmer does cannot observe any 
environmental effects to take place as a result of the change in his behaviour, or 
in the farm practice, the information does not mature into knowledge and, 
further, into environmentally friendly behaviour. Therefore, a feedback system 
to link the benefits to the actions is needed. 
4.4. The role of information 
Economists often talk about equilibrium on competitive markets at the point 
where the demand and supply meet. Competitive markets exists in the idealistic 
world of complete (or full) information and other simplistic assumptions such as 
free access to markets and multiple buyers and sellers on the markets. In reality 
these presumptions seldom hold very well. For example, information is seldom 
complete, which leads to inefficiency on markets, and this, in turn, often mani- 
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fests itself through externalities. According to Rasmusen (1994), information 
problems have come to dominate research in both microeconomics and macr-
oeconomics during the past ten years. Therefore, information is in a key role 
when defining workable policies for agricultural pollution abatement. Let us 
first inspect some definitions relating to information. 
It is very costly (or even impossible) to acquire complete information on the 
price or the quality of goods sold on markets. Thus, information remains in most 
ali cases incomplete12. (And yet we assume it to be perfect in our models!) 
Information is said to be symmetric if ali actors on the market have the same 
knowledge e.g. on the quality and/or prices of goods (or bads in case of a 
negative externality such as pollution) sold on markets. Information is asymmet-
ric if some parties have knowledge relating to goods that the others do not 
possess (Rasmusen 1994 and Varian 1990); usually it is about the quality is-
sues. In agri-environmental context: if farmers know the pollution abatement 
costs better (if not fully) than the policymaker, information is asymmetric. This 
is the typical principal-agent model in the game theory. 
According to Byström and Bromley (1996), this asymmetry of information 
motivates the principal-agent approach. In order to maximise welfare the gov-
ernment (principal) needs to set up an incentive system that makes the farmer 
(agent) improve the water quality. However, there is also some common knowl-
edge. The government can observe the outcome of farmers' factor use. Further-
more, the output and water quality are observable ex post. But despite this 
information, the government cannot observe the factor use directly, and hence 
will have less information than the farmers. 
Two other concepts predominating the information theory are moral hazard 
and adverse selection. Moral hazard refers to situations where one side of the 
market cannot observe the actions of the other. Xepapadeas (1997) sees the 
moral hazard to arise when the principal is unable to observe the nutrient 
emissions of each agent. Adverse selection (or hidden information) is related to 
a situation where one side of the market cannot observe the type or quality of 
the goods on the other side of the market (Varian 1990). In a farrning situation, 
this stems from a situation where the principal is unaware of the characteristics 
or type of each farm, which is private information known only to the farmer. 
Consequently, in lacking this information, the principal is unable to design 
policy measures which take into account the site-specific farming conditions. 
In agri-environmental policy formulation the government possesses environ-
mental information on national or regional nutrient problems. This information 
is aggregated, and it is collected either through research experiments or from 
12  A typical real life situation is that when I finally buy a new pair of jogging shoes, the following 
day I discover a yet cheaper deal for the same shoes in another shop. 
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measuring the ambient concentration of nutrients e.g. in the air or water. How-
ever, the government lacks the farm level (site-specific) information on nutrient 
emissions as the farmer does not know it either (i.e. in the traditional sense of 
NPP problem). 
If farmer knew his emissions, the situation would turn out to be a game of 
asymmetric information. In a situation where the government, in tackling with 
the goal of improving water quality, sets e.g. a tax on fertiliser inputs, it lacks 
the knowledge of how well marginal benefits and marginal costs coincide. 
Then, the polluters (i.e. the producers of emissions) can react to the tax by 
applying the best suitable techniques (also cost-effective) to the farm production 
process. Berentsen and Giesen (1997) conclude in their analysis that a substan-
tial decrease of nutrient losses can be realised by research, education, and 
extension, i.e. through elevated information level, while the income may actu-
ally increase.13 
The third phase in the evolution of a pollution control policy, according to 
Tietenberg's (1997) terminology, involves investment in the provision of infor-
mation. This augmenting role of information strategies, he argues, does not arise 
only from the increasing need for more regulatory tools, but also from the 
falling cost of information collection, aggregation, and dissemination. Lower 
information costs for producers and administration also mean lower overall 
social transaction costs for nutrient abatement (Huang and LeBlanc 1994). It 
should also be noted that 'pure' information policies do not alter the property 
rights and, therefore, policy solutions bearing information design encounter less 
resistance than conventional command-and-control policies. 
New emphasis is thus arising concerning the importance of information in 
the policy formulation. A policy which respects and utilises the information the 
farmer possesses is an alternative way to tacicle the pollution problem. This sort 
of non-regulatory approach allows farmers to decide the best management prac-
tices suitable for their conditions to improve the nutrient use efficiency. One 
promising new concept in this arena is the method of the nutrient balance 
calculations. 
4.5. The choice of a policy instrument 
Choosing between different policy instruments is a difficult task. According to 
Conway (1991), we have three main criteria which guide the selection of an 
environmental policy instrument. The first is the environmental effectiveness, 
the second is the administrative practicability, and the third is the cost-effective-
ness of gains in environmental quality. Lankoski (1996) presents a framework 
13  This may also implicate an evidence of the Porter hyphotesis described in Section 4.3.2. 
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for the assessment of the optimality of the instrument, in which the key criteria 
are environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, fairness and equity con-
siderations, political acceptability, administrative practicability, and informa-
tion content. 
Braden and Segerson (1993) present three criteria which are important in 
evaluating polices in nonpoint pollution cases: ability to target, enforceability, 
and correlation with water quality (Table 4). They also argue that no single 
instrument appears to dominate in terms of ali three criteria, and that trade-offs 
are unavoidable in the selection of policy instruments. The ability to target is 
high if the instrument efficiently correlates with the site- or time-specific envi-
ronmental responses. Enforceability requires the principal to be able to set and 
oversee that compliance with the terms of the policy is met. High correlation 
with water quality is usually reached in case of instruments that are well linked 
with the variables closely correlated to the water quality. 
Hanley (1990) points out that optimality (i.e. marginal net private benefits 
equalling marginal costs) itself is not a very good policy option. A policy 
aiming at e.g. reducing nitrates in groundwater should be targeted in such a way 
that given `arbitrary' standards of water quality and/or nitrate input limits are 
efficiently achieved at the least cost. This is because nitrates take a long time to 
travel from topsoil to groundwater, and thus the methodological problems asso-
ciated with predicting the marginal external cost to some future citizens are 
considerable . 
In the case of large numbers of small polluters, in which case monitoring 
involves practical difficulties, a tax on polluting inputs may be a second-best 
policy (Hanley 1990). However, the efficiency of such a tax would depend on 
whether the quantity of an input purchased is closely correlated with the volume 
of pollution emissions generated. Such a close correlation is usually rather 
Table 4. Evaluation of policy instruments. Source: Braden and Segerson 1993. 
Rating with respect to 
Tax or 	 ability to 	enforce- 	correlation 
Subsidy target ability 	with water 
quality 
Output 	 L 	H 	L 
Input L/M H/M M 
Emissions/Management practices 	 H 	M 	M 
Ambient concentration 	 H L/M H 
Use of liability 	 H 	L 	H 
L means low, M means medium, and H means high rating. 
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unlikely, as Braden and Segerson (1993) point out. More importantly, the effec-
tiveness of this instrument depends on the elasticity of the input demand re-
sponse to the higher input prices. In the case of fertilisers, the demand elasticity 
is quite inelastic in Finland (Ryhänen 1994). 
In general, economic incentives have many advantages over regulations (Karp 
et al. 1995). First, they can achieve the desired effect at the least possible cost. 
Second, they are easier to enforce. Third, they present fewer opportunities for 
rent-seeking behaviour; therefore, they are likely to he more effective and more 
equitable. Finally, unlike regulations, economic incentives generate revenues 
which may he used to finance the incentive programme. 
Market-based incentive systems `automatically' lead to the cost-effective 
allocation of the pollution-control burden among firms. By forcing firms to 
factor environmental costs into their decision-making, these systems create 
powerful incentives for firms to find cleaner production technologies, i.e. to 
intemalise production extemalities. Market-based incentives also make the en-
vironmental debate more understandable to the general public by focusing atten-
tion to what our environmental goals should be, rather than on difficult techni-
cal questions about different means for reaching these goals. (Stavins 1992). 
5. Nutrient balances and weather 
5.1. Data description 
As already mentioned in Section 2.3., we have observed the importance of the 
climate to the nutrient balances in Finland. A question emerged on the feasibil-
ity of the nutrient balances when facing the problem of extemal factors, such as 
the weather and soil type, having an effect on the build-up of the surplus. Ideally 
the nutrient balance calculations would allow us to inspect the agricultural 
pollution from a point source perspective as the balance calculation would give 
us the information on the emissions of the farm. However, there are evident 
problems to make such simplistic assumptions. This chapter explores the effect 
of the weather on nutrient balances. 
Because of the weather, yield levels vary considerably from year to year in 
Finland as Finland is located in a fringe area for the cultivation of many crops. 
Wheat and rye can he grown in Southern Finland but not in Northem Finland. In 
addition, the border for growing e.g. barley is met in Lapland. The question of 
how important a role the external factors (especially the weather) have in terms 
of the nutrient balance needs to he studied in detail. If extemal dictate the level 
of the nutrient balance to any greater extent, setting a levy on the surplus loses 
some of its justification. This problem bears connection to the general theme of 
the impact of the climate change to agricultural production. 
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Figure 14. The four Finnish re-
search stations. 
The importance of extemal factors in the formation of the nutrient surpluses 
is often questioned in this context (e.g. Lankoski 1996). Mukula and Rantanen 
(1989) have studied the risks to the yield of arable crops in Finland. The 
estimated variation coefficients14 were 15% for barley, 19% for winter wheat, 
16% for spring wheat, 11% for barley, and 9% for oats. 
The yield levels are closely linked to nutrient balances, especially to the 
nitrogen balance, where the correlation is over 90%. Therefore the variation 
coefficients also reflect the magnitude of the variation of the nutrient balances 
due to climatic factors. However, in order to get more updated figures an 
analysis of more recent data was conducted. 
This question was studied based on the data from the Agricultural Research 
Centre (MTT). The data were originally used in comparing the crop production 
in organic (or the so-called self-sufficient) and conventional farming. However, 
only the data from conventional fallning were used in this study. 
The data cover the years 1983-1993. Four crops in four research stations 
were cultivated. The geographical loca-
tion of these stations is presented in the 
map in Figure 14. The two southem re-
search stations have fairly similar climatic 
conditions, and, correspondingly, so have 
the two northem stations. 
The data consist of altogether 413 ob-
servations. Monthly data on the tempera-
ture and precipitation were available dur-
ing this period from ali four research sta-
tions. Crops were fertilised at normal fer-
tilising levels and, no manure was used. 
Tables 5 and 6 depict some key elements 
of the data. 
In Table 5 the nitrogen surplus in kg/ 
ha has a very high standard deviation, 
especially in case of potatoes. This means 
that there appears considerable variance 
in the actual crop uptake of nitrogen. Both 
rye (in average, almost 91 kg/ha of nitro-
gen) and potatoes (88 kg/ha in phospho-
rous) have very high nutrient surpluses. 
The variation coefficients for nutrient 
surpluses are rather high, particularly for 
14  The percentage of standard deviation of the average yield, i.e. vc = shavg 
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Table 5. Mean, standard deviation, and variation coefficient for nutrient sur-
pluses by research station and crop in 1983-1993. 
Research 
station 
Crop obs. Nitrogen 
Mean StdDev VarCo 
Phosphorous 
Mean StdDev VarCo 
Satakunta Rye 18 84.7 12.3 15% 30.2 7.5 25% 
Barley 36 35.0 21.5 61% 27.3 3.7 14% 
Oats 36 18.4 16.5 90% 24.0 4.5 19% 
Potatoes 18 28.5 18.8 66% 89.7 7.6 8% 
Sata-Häme Rye 18 93.8 14.4 15% 31.2 6.2 20% 
Barley 33 54.2 15.7 29% 30.6 4.7 15% 
Oats 30 38.1 15.3 40% 28.3 4.9 17% 
Potatoes 17 11.2 30.9 276% 87.7 9.6 11% 
Etelä- Rye 18 84.4 11.2 13% 29.5 5.5 19% 
Pohjanmaa Barley 36 38.7 12.4 32% 26.8 4.7 18% 
Oats 36 9.7 16.7 172% 22.4 5.4 24% 
Potatoes 18 19.8 26.1 132% 88.6 7.0 8% 
Karjala Rye 18 99.9 18.5 19% 32.3 4.7 15% 
Barley 33 43.0 20.4 47% 28.1 5.4 19% 
Oats 30 27.3 26.3 96% 26.0 6.8 26% 
Potatoes 18 15.8 30.3 192% 86.2 8.6 10% 
Average Rye 72 90.7 15.5 17% 30.8 6.0 19% 
Barley 138 42.5 19.1 45% 28.1 4.8 17% 
Oats 132 22.5 21.5 96% 25.0 5.8 23% 
Potatoes 71 18.9 27.1 143% 88.0 8.2 9% 
nitrogen. Even though potatoes are very good in utilising nitrogen, it is very 
fragile in terms of weather conditions as summer night frost may cause almost a 
total loss of crop. This took place in a few cases, and the yields were under 
15,000 kg/ha, which caused a very high nutrient surplus. This is also true for 
oats, where night frost can cause a dramatic decrease in the yield levels (see also 
Kettunen et al. 1987). 
The next question is to what extent the weather factors contribute to the 
variance in nutrient surpluses and, therefore, to the ability of the plants to use 
fertilisers. The weather data during the summer months at the research stations 
is shown in Table 6. 
It is clear that weather conditions vary considerably from year to year (Table 
6). For example, the year 1987 was very poor for crop growth because of the 
low effective temperature sum (ETS). It was some 20% lower than on average 
on these four research stations during the time period of 1983-1993. The sum-
mer 1991 was colder than the average. In 1988 the temperature sum in May-
August was 16% higher than normal, and as much as 33% higher than in 1987. 
In comparing the data on corresponding nitrogen surpluses at national level as 
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Table 6. The effective temperature sum and rainfall (mm) in May-August in four 











1983 1,067 206 1,002 182 1,079 223 1,089 199 
1984 1,091 296 1,068 268 1,081 248 1,085 190 
1985 1,026 216 974 203 1,011 245 960 313 
1986 1,098 187 1,049 235 1,092 285 1,066 293 
1987 807 320 780 189 786 304 844 428 
1988 1,230 320 1,160 286 1,211 429 1,177 303 
1989 1,091 230 1,052 259 1,093 227 1,122 186 
1990 1,072 184 992 221 1,032 211 890 196 
1991 993 254 960 288 984 242 981 395 
1992 1,104 279 1,041 212 1,097 257 990 217 
1993 1,015 320 932 308 1,001 305 904 386 
aver. 1,054 256 1,001 241 1,042 271 1,010 282 
std.dev 103 54 96 43 105 61 106 91 
shown in Figure 7 on page 25, we can conclude that at aggregated level there is 
some evidence on the link between the temperature sum and nitrogen surplus. 
The same can be said for the part of the precipitation. The year 1987, in 
particular, shows a clear connection. Next, the situation was scrutinised at a 
more disaggregated level. 
5.2. The effect of weather on the nutrient balance calculations 
The data were analysed using PC-SPSS programme. First, correlation matrices 
for each four crops were calculated to see if there exists a linear correlation 
between the nutrient balances with respect to precipitation and ETS. Secondly, 
variance analyses were performed to distinguish the relevant weather factors 
having an effect on the formation of nutrient surpluses. The analyses were done 
with respect to nitrogen and phosphorous. 
The highest, statistically significant at 5% level, correlations are shown in 
Table 7. The data suggest that proper precipitation is clearly significant for the 
build-up of the nutrient surpluses. Excessive rain in May and August, in particu-
lar, result in high nutrient surpluses. In the case of the other months the correla-
tions are also mostly positive, i.e. the more it rains the greater are the nutrient 
surpluses. There also occur a few negative correlations. These indicate that 
when drought takes place, rain after the dry season improves the overall nutrient 
utilisation. 
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Table 7. Most important statistically significant correlations between nutrient 
surplus and weather factors in May-August. 







6 	7 	8 5-8 
Effective temperature sum 
in May-August 
month 
5 	6 	7 	8 	5-8 
1 Rye N .56 
P .55 .53 .67 .73 
2 Rye N .53 
P -.47 .52 .73 .47 .59 .61 .77 
3 Rye N .59 .72 -.63 -.72 -.49 
P -.83 
4 Rye N .66 .74 .80 .81 -.54 
P -.64 
1 Barley N -.53 .36 -.60 
P .37 -.55 
2 Barley N .38 -.38 -.55 
P -.45 -.45 
3 Barley N 
P .36 .36 .50 .37 
4 Barley N .61 .55 .42 .69 -.53 
P .64 .37 .50 .40 
1 Oats N .75 .66 -.37 
P .54 .34 -.44 
2 Oats N -.55 
P .47 -.40 -.54 
3 Oats N .66 .54 .48 .49 
P .50 .40 .38 .59 .47 
4 Oats N .76 .53 .42 .48 
P .70 .67 .52 
1 Potatoes N .58 .85 -.56 
P .62 
2 Potatoes N -.62 
P .65 -.79 
3 Potatoes N .82 -.82 -.83 
P .77 -.76 -.51 -.56 
4 Potatoes N .54 .58 -.52 
P .67 .51 -.52 
at 5% risk level 
Areas: 1 = Satakunta, 2 = Etelä-Pohjanmaa, 3 = Sata-Häme, 4 = Karjala 
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The temperature, especially in August, is significant for the build-up of 
nutrient surpluses, as the very consistent negative correlations for that month 
indicate. The higher the degree-days in August is the lower is the nutrient 
surplus, and the better the nutrients are utilised. The same holds true to some 
extent for the ETS in May. However, there exists positive correlations for oats 
and rye mainly in June and July, indicating that these crops do not benefit from 
high ETS. 
In the table above potatoes seem to have very uniform correlations. The 
relationship between the nitrogen surplus and precipitation in May by research 
unit is plotted in Figure 15. 
Figure 15 shows that there appears a clear tendency to get high nitrogen 
surpluses for potatoes if May is a wet month. The correlations for this relation-
ship shown in Table 7 are significant at 5% risk level for ali research units 
except that of Etelä-Pohjanmaa. 
In general, only few correlations over 60% exist. Therefore, it can also be 
assumed that the correlation between e.g. precipitation and nutrient surplus is 
not linear. Too little rain e.g. in May or too much rain in May probably have a 
similar effect on nutrient surplus, i.e. extreme rainfall conditions result in high 
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Figure 15. Scatterplot of nitrogen surplus for potatoes and precipitation in May 
by research arca. 
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likely to be non-linear as has also been noted by Teigen and Thomas (1995), 
who postulate that the weather is the single most important factor influencing 
crop production. They present models showing weather-yield response to ex-
plain more than 90 percent of yield variation. 
Kettunen et al. (1987) conducted linear regressions analyses to find out 
weather response to crop growth. They found out that temperature or precipita-
tion summed on a monthly basis could not capture the bio-physical phases in the 
crop growth thus resulting in poor regression models. As the data used here was 
solely calculated on a monthly basis the more revealing models could not be 
used. 
5.3. The magnitude of weather factors 
In order to quantify the effects of weather related factors to the build-up of the 
nutrient balances, weather variables were categorised and analysed against the 
nutrient balances in the variance analyses. The total effective temperature sum 
from May to August was split into three groups in 1:2:1 proportions. This 
method created the groups of `cold', `normal' and `warm' summer. The total 
rainfall for the same period was categorised accordingly. In the variance analy-
ses the t-tests (both Tukey' s t-test and Student-Newman-Keuls t-test) were 
conducted at 5% risk level to find out the differences between the groups. 
The findings of the variance analyses with respect to the total data are shown 
in Table 8. There usually exists a statistically (at 5% level) significant differ-
ence between the mean of nutrient surpluses when comparing the cold summer 
Table 8. The effect of temperature on nutrient surpluses. 
Crop 	Nutrient 	The difference* in the nutrient surpluses 	Average 
surplus between the temperature groups, kg/ha (%) surplus 








Rye N 12.1 (12%) 15.8 (16%) 90.7 
P 30.8 
Barley N 10.5 (20%) 12.4 (24%) 42.5 
P 28.1 
Oats N -13.6 (82%) -13.3 (70%) 22.5 
P -4.4 (19%) -3.7 (15%) 25.0 
Potatoes N 31.9 (90%) -21.4 (86%) 18.9 
P 6.5 (7%) 88.0 
* statistically significant differences at 5% level. 
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to the normal summer, and between the cold summer and warm summer. For 
example, in a cold summer, nitrogen surplus for rye is 12.1 kg/ha higher (that is 
12% higher) than in the case of a normal summer. In a cold summer the nitrogen 
surplus for potatoes is 31.9 kg/ha higher than in a normal summer. These mean 
that a cold summer usually leads to high nutrient losses. 
According to Table 8, it seems evident that the higher effective temperature 
sum is beneficial for the efficient uptake (i.e. low nutrient surplus) of nutrients 
in the case of rye and barley. However, in the case of oats the situation is 
different, and the negative signs for the difference indicate that higher ETS 
yields higher nutrient losses in case of both nitrogen and phosphorous. The 
same is true for the nitrogen surplus of potatoes when comparing a normal 
summer to a warm summer (i.e., 21.4 kg/ha higher N-surplus in a warm suin' 
mer). 
Furthermore, a variance analysis of a similar type was conducted to see if the 
precipitation has an impact on nutrient surpluses (Table 9). The table indicates 
that precipitation is of lesser importance to the build-up of the nutrient sur-
pluses. However, wet growing conditions increase the nitrogen surpluses in the 
case of rye and oats. Rye has, on average, 24.6 kg/ha higher nitrogen surpluses 
during a wet summer compared to a dry summer, and 23.1 kg/ha higher surplus 
when comparing a wet summer to a normal summer. 
The relationship between the weather and the nutrient surplus was not ex-
plored more thoroughly, as it is not in the scope of an economic study, but in 
that of a biological one. From the analyses above it can be concluded that 
biological processes are very complex as well as very sensitive to precipitation 
and, especially, to temperature. The sensitivity of crop response to weather 
conditions leads to similar responses with respect to the nutrient surplus. How-
ever, this finding somewhat shadows the potential efficacy of using the NBCs as 
a policy instrument, and it should also curb the policymakers' eagerness to set 
policy measures, such as levies, on nitrogen surplus. The system is unjust if a 
Table 9. The effect of precipitation on nutrient surpluses. 
Crop 	Nutrient 	The difference* in the nutrient surpluses 	Average 
surplus between the precipitation groups, kg/ha (%) surplus 
The type of summer 
wet vs. dry 	wet vs. normal 	normal vs. dry 	(kg/ha) 
Rye 	N 	24.6 (23%) 	23.1 (21%) 90.7 
30.8 




* statistically significant differences at 5% level. 
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farmer who is cultivating according to his expectations of a normal summer and 
faces a bad year for crop growth is penalised by his higher than average nutrient 
surpluses. Furthermore, the ambient level of pollution can increase despite the 
farmer's own contribution to abate the pollution. At least these characteristics 
need to be taken into consideration in the policy formulation. 
The analyses above were conducted on the basis of a data from research 
stations. Next, the situation is looked at the farm level, based on farm level data 
from Eastern Finland. 
6. Nutrient balances on dairy farms in Kainuu 
6.1. Data description 
Weather factors are significant in terms of the build-up of nutrient balances. The 
previous section shed some light on the crop level magnitude of this. At farm 
level the situation is more complex than on research parcels, and even more 
complex in a situation where manure is applied to the soil. 
The nutrient balance data from Kainuu15 Rural Agricultural Centre were 
collected during 1995 and 1996 for the year 1994. Ali three balances (i.e. farm 
gate balance, surface balance, and cattle balance) were calculated for the farms. 
Altogether some 250 dairy farms are involved in a local dairy project, which has 
developed an environmental index where agricultural nutrient balance is one of 
the factors in the index (Hämäläinen and Kaataja 1996). Of these farms, 191 
farms were included in the analysis. The data are summarised in Table 10. 
These farms are characterised by fairly high milk yields and a low average 
animal density. Farm gate balance and surface balance show nitrogen surpluses 
fairly close to each other (theoretically they should be equal, see Section 2.2.1.), 
which speaks for the good accuracy in reporting the elements of the calculation. 
The nitrogen surpluses are rather high, i.e. in the range of 120-130 kg/ha. The 
utilisation percentage tells how well the nutrients are captured in the production 
process. The cattle balance surpluses in kg/LU are somewhat lower than the 
ones reported in Mälkiä (1997), i.e. 96 kg/LU vs. 114 kg/LU. 
It is obvious that the utilisation of nutrients is better on the arable land than 
in the cattle house. Lankoski (1996) estimated nitrogen utilisation to be about 
60-70% in the cereal farming and 30-40% in the livestock production (net 
surface balance). This explains the difference between the utilisation percent-
ages between the farm gate balance and surface balance. The very low minimum 
nutrient surpluses and, consequently, high utilisation percentages are from or-
ganic farms. 
15 Kainuu area is marked on the map in Figure 14 on page 57. 
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Table 10. Description of the dairy farm data from Kainuu: Nitrogen balance. 
Mean StdDev Maximum Minimum 
Farm size, ha 22.9 9.3 64.3 7.3 
Livestock units (LU) 18.2 5.9 36.5 6.1 
Livestock units/ha 0.84 0.20 1.73 0.39 
Milk yield/cow, kg 7,343 1,014 9,856 4,400 
Nitrogen balance 
Farm gate surplus, kg/ha 128.4 37.9 214.7 20.0 
Farm gate, utilis. % 19.4 5.4 51.6 8.7 
Surface surplus, kg/ha 119.0 40.8 271.6 32.1 
Surface, utilis. % 41.7 9.9 71.1 18.4 
Cattle surplus, kg/ha 79.7 23.0 213.9 31.3 
Cattle surplus, kg/LU 95.7 15.8 158.1 56.4 
Cattle, utilis. % 26.7 3.6 35.3 17.5 
The factors contributing to the build-up of nutrient balances were estimated 
from the data. Furthermore, the 21 farms (having a complete data) in the sam-
ple, which are also bookkeeping farms, were analysed to find out the relation-
ship between farm economic indicators and nutrient balances. 
6.2. Nitrogen surpluses 
The reasons for high nutrient losses are manifold and depend on the circum-
stances of the farm, but some common nominators also exist. For example, in 
Germany Doluschitz et al. (1992) analysed the factors having an effect on the 
build-up of nitrogen surpluses (farm gate balance). They found out that, on 
average, the animal density is one of the most crucial factors in explaining the 
level of nitrogen surpluses. However, on individual farms the connection be-
tween the animal density and N-surplus was not that well verified. 
Accordingly, analyses on the factors contributing to the build-up of nitrogen 
surpluses were conducted on the Finnish data. A regression model explaining 
the nitrogen surplus from the cattle balance by arable land area (HA) and the 
number of livestock units (LU) gave the following regression (see Annex 5); 
N-surplus cattie = 80.29 + 3.39LU - 2.71HA; R2 = 51% 
(20.37) (10.61) (-13.60) 
Ali coefficients are significant at 1% risk level. The model states that adding 
one more livestock unit to the farm increases the nitrogen surplus by about 
3.4 kg/ha. However, increasing the arable land area by one hectare decreases the 
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N-surplus by 2.7 kg/ha. This result reveals that reducing the livestock density by 
one unit is a more efficient way to reduce the nitrogen surplus than increasing 
the arable land area by one unit. Which method is the more cost effective one 
depends on the relative prices of production factors, as the following simple 
calculation shows. 
If the farmer wants to decrease the farm' s average nitrogen surplus by 10 kg/ 
ha, he needs to increase his arable land area by 3.75 ha. If the price of land is 
10,000 FIM/ha and the yearly gross margin incomel6 from cultivating barley is 
3,000 FIM/ha, this costs him about 4,500 FIM/year in a five-year period. Simi-
larly, the same decrease in the nitrogen smplus is attained if the farmer reduces 
his livestock by 3.0 livestock units. If the farmer disposes of three cows, from 
which he gets FIM 1,000 each thus losing a gross margin income of 8,000 FIM/ 
year, this costs him 7,400 FIM/year for five years. In this scenario it is cheaper 
to buy new land than to reduce livestock in order to reduce the nitrogen surplus 




Nutrient use efficiency of nitrogen 
by cattle balance, % 
-24.3 	24.3-27.1 	27.1-29.4 	29.4- Total 
Count 13 12 15 8 48 
below Exp value 11.1 11.3 14.3 11.3 48 
16.3 ha Row Pct 27.1% 25.0% 31.3% 16.7% 100% 
Col Pct 29.5% 26.7% 26.3% 17.8% 25.1% 
Count 10 12 11 15 48 
16.3- Exp value 11.1 11.3 14.3 11.3 48 
22.0 ha Row Pct 20.8% 25.0% 22.9% 31.3% 100% 
Col Pct 22.7% 26.7% 19.3% 33.3% 25.1% 
Count 7 8 18 13 46 
22.0- Exp value 10.6 10.8 13.7 10.8 46 
27.4 ha Row Pct 15.2% 17.4% 39.1% 28.3% 100% 
Col Pct 15.9% 17.8% 31.6% 28.9% 24.1% 
Count 14 13 13 9 49 
over Exp value 11.3 11.5 14.6 11.5 49 
27.4 ha Row Pct 18.6% 26.5% 26.5% 18.4% 100% 
Col Pct 31.8% 28.9% 22.8% 20.0% 25.7% 
Chi-square vaille is 8.804, its significance is 0.456 at 9 degrees of freedom. 
16 Gross margin income of a crop is obtained by subtracting total variable costs from total 
income. For simplicity and comparability issues the calculation does not take into account 
interest rate or work costs. 
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by 10 kg/ha. However, if the price of land is 15,000 FIM/ha, the cost to the 
farmer in the land buying option rises close to 8,300 FIM/year, and the situation 
is reversed. 
One interesting question is the following: 'How do small farms compare to 
big farms in respect of the nutrient use efficiency?'. The farms were grouped 
into four size categories. Correspondingly, the nitrogen use efficiency by cattle 
balance (i.e. the quotient of the nitrogen fed to the cattle and the nitrogen in the 
milk and meat) was divided into four groups. The cross-tabulation of these 
categories is shown in Table 11. 
The table shows that the group of the smallest farms (under 16.3 ha) contains 
only 16.7% of the farms in the best utilisation category. However, the group of 
the biggest farms also has a relatively low percentage (18.4%) in the highest 
efficiency category. The group with the farm size of 22.0 - 27.4 ha has clearly 
the highest nitrogen use efficiency. In this group, over 67% of the farms have 
better than the average nitrogen use efficiency. 47 farms of the 96 farms with 
under 22 ha of arable land have the nitrogen use efficiency of under 27.1%. In 
contrast, 42 farms of the 95 farms with over 22 hectares of arable land have the 
nitrogen use efficiency below 27.1%. Thus, there seems to be a tendency that 
the bigger farms have a higher nitrogen use efficiency by cattle balance. 
6.3. Nutrient balances and farm economic indicators 
Altogether 21 farms• of the total of 191 farms in the data were bookkeeping 
farms in 1994. These farms keep very detailed records on the farm' s monetary 
flows, but this data collection mostly lacks the data on quantities. (Necessary 
data for calculating the nutrient balances will be collected from bookkeeping 
farms starting from 1997.) 
The data of nutrient balances were compared to some key economic vari-
ables, and analyses were conducted for quantifying the relationship between 
these factors. The data from these 21 farms are summarised in Table 12. These 
farms are fairly similar to the rest of the sample, on average. However, the 
nitrogen surpluses seem to be slightly higher than in the base data. 
In general, the relationship between the farm economic indicators and the 
nutrient balance calculations in the data is relatively scarce. Nevertheless, some 
observations can be highlighted from the data. Pearson correlations17 were 
conducted to assess the relationship between the nutrient use efficiency and 
farm economic indicators. The main findings are reported in Table 13. The 
column `input costs' includes the costs for fodder and fertilising, costs for fuel 
17 Pearson correlation is a measure of linear association between two variables, 
i.e. /((xi-xavg)(yi-Yavg))/sqr((xi-xavg)2 (Yi-Yavg)2) 
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Table 12. Description of the bookkeeping dairy farm data from Kainuu: Nitro-
gen balance. 
Mean StdDev Minimum Maximum 
Farm size, ha 22.0 8.1 10.3 40.7 
Livestock units (LU) 17.6 5.8 8.3 30.1 
Livestock units/ha 0.82 0.17 0.41 1.23 
Milk yield/cow, kg 7,265 988 5,000 9,054 
Nitrogen balance, kg/ha 
Farm gate surplus, kg/ha 134.1 47.0 25.0 214.7 
Farm gate, utilis. % 20.0 6.5 10.6 37.6 
Surface sumlus, kg/ha 128.5 54.4 32.0 271.6 
Surface, utilis. % 41.3 10.3 22.1 62.6 
Cattle surplus, kg/ha 79.9 21.9 32.6 132.5 
Cattle surplus, kg/LU 96.6 15.9 75.2 133.4 
Cattle, utilis. % 27.4 4.1 19.8 35.3 
and energy, and costs for pesticides. `Other costs' include the costs for main-
taining ditches, insurance costs, and rent costs. 
The results suggest a clear link between the cost structure and the nitrogen 
surpluses. The correlations are positive (e.g. between 0.559 and 0.645 in the 
case of total costs) meaning that high costs per hectare, and specifically high 
input costs per hectare (correlations being well over 0.7), result in high nitrogen 
surpluses and, consequently, high nutrient emissions to the environment. The 
statistical evidence is well pronounced. In other words, the lower production 
costs coincide with efficient nitrogen use. This finding corresponds to the 
Table 13. Correlations between cost factors of farm production and nitrogen 
surpluses. 
Nitrogen balance, kg/ha Agricultural production cost, FIM/ha 
animal input 	other total 
purchase costs costs costs 
Farm gate surplus, kg/ha 0.764** 0.559** 
Farm gate, utilis. % 
Surface surplus, kg/ha 0.766* 0.644** 
Surface, utilis. % -0.559** -0.442* 
Cattle surplus, kg/ha 0.436* 0.724** 0.645** 
Cattle, utilis. % 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Helander' s (1996) results from pig production. When scrutinising the input 
factors more closely, the main component contributing to a high correlation was 
found to he the cost of fertilisers. The correlations were in the range of 0.64 to 
0.69, depending on the nitrogen surplus category. 
Although the utilisation percentage figures do not often have a significant 
correlation with the cost components, there is a negative relationship between 
these factors. The only case in which the correlation is significant at 5% level is 
the utilisation percentage for surface balance in relation to the input cost and the 
total costs. 
Of course, the cost factors are just one side of the coin, and we also have to 
look at the income factors to gain a better picture of the matter. Again, Pearson 
correlations (for the nitrogen surplus per hectare vs. farm income per hectare) 
were calculated; and the results are shown in Table 14. 
In general, the higher the agricultural income is the higher are also the 
nutrient surpluses. The negative correlation of utilisation percentage for surface 
balance with respect to total income indicates the same phenomena. Income 
from crop production has significant correlation only with respect to surplus of 
surface balance. All three balances give significant correlations with respect to 
farm income form animal husbandry, and they are in the range of 0.521 to 
0.596. Hence, high total agricultural income is related to weak nutrient use 
efficiency, but this finding is less revealing than the cost inspection above. 
The data from Kainuu dairy farms did not allow for calculating the produc-
tion costs by output. Thus, we lack the proper data for a deeper analysis of the 
farm economic indicators with respect to the nutrient surpluses. Therefore, a 
modelling approach is developed to clarify this relationship, and to assess 
policy measures utilising the information from the NBCs. 
Table 14. Correlations between income factors offarm production and nitrogen 
surpluses. 







Farm gate surplus, kg/ha 0.521* 0.561** 
Farm gate, utilis. % 
Surface surphis, kg/ha 0.584** 0.567** 0.641** 
Surface, utilis. % -0.478* 
Cattle surplus, kg/ha 0.596** 0.593** 
Cattle, utilis. % 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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6.4. Environmental policy instruments at farm level 
6.4.1. Modelling 
Tietenberg (1992) wisely warns that modelling is simplifying reality and, be-
cause of this, the selective nature of models may not yield completely right 
conclusions. Therefore, models should always be viewed with some scepticism. 
Agri-environmental models are usually of three types: i.e. 1) optimisation mod-
els, 2) econometric models, or 3) simulation models. The choice of the model-
ling technique depends mainly on the available data. At the moment, no appro-
priate Finnish data on nutrient balances is available for econometric analysis. 
Therefore the approach used here is a combination of the modelling types 1 and 
3. 
At farm level, a farmer reacts to the measures which the policymaker has set 
in order to achieve a certain quality of the environment (i.e. the principal-agent 
framework). As the water quality issues are the most prevailing ones, let us 
inspect the consequences in the agricultural sector that follow from the proposi-
tion the environmental administration (SYKE 1995) has on reducing emissions 
to watercourses in Finland. The question to be answered is: "How do the NBCs 
compare with other policy measures in pollution abatement policy by the cost-
efficiency criterion?". 
The objective expressed by SYKE is to reduce the total Finnish nitrogen 
load to watercourses from the base level of 63,000 tonnes/year to 45,000 tonnes/ 
year, i.e. by about 30%. For agricultural sector the goal for arable farming is to 
reduce the nitrogen load from the average load of 30,000 tonnes/year to 15,000 
tonnes/year by the year 2005, i.e. 50%. Let us use the 30 percent reduction 
objective for agriculture in reducing nitrogen leaching to the watercourses as a 
yardstick for the policy assessment. 
The cost-efficiency criterion is used for comparing different policy measures 
with each other in the context of the above-mentioned objective. A control 
measure is more efficient than another one if it yields the desired environmental 
quality at lower costs or if it yields at the same costs a better quality of the 
environment (Uimonen 1989). The cost-efficiency criterion can be expressed by 
marginal abatement (or average abatement) cost formula, i.e. the change in 
profit with respect to the change in nutrient runoffs. More formally: 
(13) 	 MAC = (Sir I 50) I (SA. I (50)= Sz I SÅ 
where 	r is profit, 
0 is an economic policy instrument, and 
is the nutrient runoff. 
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Three policy measures are assessed here, i.e. the application of: 1) tax on 
nitrogen in fertilisers, 2) levy on the nitrogen surplus (based on nutrient balance 
calculation), and 3) output tax. The approach is similar to Sumelius (1994) and 
Lankoski (1996), with some exceptions. Sumelius was more interested to test 
different crop response functions, and Lankoski studied only options 1 and 2 
and with respect to barley. In this respect the cost-efficiency assessment for 
silage is studied, and the stochastic variables from climatic variability are incor-
porated into the modelling. Yield levels and nutrient balances are allowed to 
vary when simulating the weather response to the policy instrument ranking. 
The leakage of the nitrogen from manure is also examined here. 
6.4.2. Production function 
It is an extensive task to model a whole farm with its multiple inputs and 
outputs, and incorporate environmental factors into it. As the purpose of this 
research is to focus on assessing the feasibility of using the information from the 
NBCs in policy simulation, a more general model is needed. Because environ-
mental problems in dairy farming stem from the use of manure, the role of 
manure as a production factor is inspected more thoroughly. 
A crop response function (i.e. the effect of nitrogen input on silage yield) 
was estimated from the data of the bookkeeping farms from Kainuu. The de-
rived yield function was: 
ys = 1727 + 22.01*N - 0.03764*N2 
(.937) (.820) 	(-.393) 
where Nis the amount of nitrogen input. The sample size was only 17 observa-
tions producing a rather unsatisfactory model with low a coefficient of determi-
nation (adjusted R2=13%). The coefficients are not statistically significant at 
5% risk level, yet they are of a logical sign (see Annex 5). Compared to the 
Heikkilä' s (1980) function on a neighbouring area, i.e. 
= 3164 + 21.60*N - 0.0341*N2 
the estimated function is very similar, except for the constant term. Even though 
in the function by Heikkilä the constant is almost double that of the estimated 
function, this does not bring about a very big difference in the yield level at the 
common fertilising range. The estimated function yields a little lower biologi-
cally optimal level of nitrogen fertilisation than Heikkilä' s function (i.e. 292 kg/ 
ha vs. 317 kg/ha). Because of its better statistical properties, Heikkilä' s crop 
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6.4.3. Leakage function 
As there is no other appropriate leakage function available at present, a leakage 
function estimated by Simmelsgaard (1991) for the Danish circumstances is 
used here, and applied to Finnish conditions. The general form of the function 
is: 
(14) 	 ln(y / ) = bo + bN 
where N = relative nitrogen fertilisation with respect to the normal 
intensity (1N) for fertilising the crop, the range of 0.5<=N<=1.0 
y = leakage at fertiliser intensity level N 
yn = nitrogen leakage at average nitrogen use (1N) 
bo = the constant 
b = a parameter 
The function measures changes in the leakage solely as a function of the 
fertiliser intensity level. Of course, fertilising level is not the only factor con-
tributing to the leakage, as Sirnmelsgaard points out (the other main factors 
being the soil type, climate, and fertilising practices.). A function like this can 
be used to estimate average changes in the leakage as a consequence of a change 
in the fertilising practice over a number of years (not on a yearly basis), as 
Sumelius (1994) emphasises. Following Sumelius, this leakage function can he 
presented graphically (Figure 16). The normal fertiliser intensity level (1N) is 
here 90 kg/hal8. The parameter b has a value of 0.7, as in Sumelius' research 
N-fertilising, kg/ha 
40 kg N-leaching 
30 kg N-leaching 
20 kg N-leaching 
-10 kg N-leaching 
-5 kg N-leaching 
Figure 16. Approximated N-leakages at different fertilisation intensity levels. 
18 According to the FAEP the base fertilising level for fodder cereals is 90 kg/ha (MMM 1994). 
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and that of Lankoski (1996), hence yielding the function as y=yn e° 7(1\7-1) • Alter-
ing the value b has but a negligible effect on the leakage. The value for y 
changes from 5 kg/ha to 40 kg/ha, i.e. at the average level of 90 kg/ha (drawn as 
a vertical line in the figure) of N-fertiliser the N-leakage is between 5-40 kg/ha. 
The figure indicates that e.g. on the level of an average nitrogen leakage of 
20 kg/ha the leakage varies from 14.1 to 28.4 kg/ha, depending on the fertilisa-
tion level. From the figure above as well as from the leakage function itself it 
can concluded that the leakage function exhibits increasing returns to scale. The 
convexity of the leakage function is evident from the figure. The mathematical 
proof of this can be realised through the base assumption of f(tx)>(x), when 
t>1 (see e.g. Varian (1990)). As we now have a semi-logarithmic function, 
ln((y+t)/y)=1n(y+t)-1n(y) we get ln(y+t)-1n(y)>tln(y/y), y>0.5. (In addition, 
if we assume the production function to be concave the emission function must 
be convex (Siebert 1995).) In other words, if the fertiliser intensity rises, a 
proportionally greater increase occurs in the leakage. 
Simmelsgaard also estimated a leakage function for nitrogen in manure. He 
assumed that leakage from manure fertilising is 2.8 times greater than from 
mineral fertilising, thus presenting the following function: 
(15) 	 y =y (4.6e" N-1) —1.8) 
Again, N represents the quotient between the real amount of manure applied 
to the normal level of manure application, and yn is the leakage in normal level 
of manure application. Using Simmelsgaard' s assumption of 40% nitrogen utili-
sation of the total nitrogen in the manure for plants we can calculate the leakage 
between 2 to 20 kg/ha. Under these assumptions we can draw a similar graph for 
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Figure 18. Leakage of nitrogen when 45 kg/ha of nitrogen is applied from both 
fertilisers and manure (totalling 90 kg/ha). 
As can be seen in the figure, the slopes of the curves are much steeper than in 
the previous case. Here on a average nitrogen leakage of 10 kg/ha the leakage 
varies between 14.4 to 47.3 kg/ha, again depending on the fertilisation level. 
This indicates that the nitrogen in manure is more susceptible to leak to water-
courses than fertiliser nitrogen. We can also combine these two functions. In a 
situation where both a fertiliser and manure are used corresponding to 45 kg of 
nitrogen per hectare, thus resulting in a total nitrogen application of 90 kg/ha, 
we get the following situation (Figure 18). 
The figure also shows quite clearly that using commercial fertilisers reduces 
the risk of leakage. The leakage of nitrogen increases here, on average, twice 
(2.05 times) as fast when using manure than when a fertiliser is used. 
6.4.4. Cost-efficiency scenarios 
Analyses of the cost-efficiency of the policy instruments were conducted on an 
Excel spreadsheet. The input-output quantities of silage production on the 17 
Kainuu dairy farms were used. In the base model, a farmer optimises the profit 
when encountering three different policy options, i.e. a tax on a nitrogen ferti-
liser, a levy on the nitrogen surplus (i.e. an effluent tax), or a tax on the silage 
price. 
The farm uses first ali its manure at a fixed rate, thus changing the use of 
purchased commercial fertilisers. Nutrient balances were calculated by means 
of the surface balance method. The model does not allow for the option of 
transporting or selling manure elsewhere, or a technical change to take place. 
The model simply compares the economic and environmental implications un-
der different policy schemes. Table 15 shows the results in the basic situation 
co 
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Table 15. The effect of diffirent policy instruments on silage production on 
Kainuu dairy farms. 
abate- 	level of instrument, 	average abatement cost, 	change in profit, 





















5% 1.07 1.54 0.08 14.5 33.9 71.8 -102 -249 -451 
10% 1.33 7.28 0.26 26.5 67.0 98.6 -472 -1,100 -1,627 
15% 1.61 14.89 0.39 31.5 89.0 100.3 -821 -2,156 -2,400 
20% 1.91 22.76 0.48 33.0 107.4 98.1 -1,153 -3,460 -3,051 
25% 2.25 37.85 0.54 33.0 126.4 93.2 -1,470 -5,098 -3,620 
30% 2.68 48.51 0.57 31.9 145.1 88.1 -1,770 -6,700 -4,204 
* relative to the original price of nitrogen which, on average, was 7.47 FIM/kg. 
** relative to the original price of silage, which was 0.30 FIM/kg. 
where 5-30 percent abatement levels are met. The values of the parameters used 
in the model are presented in more detail in Annex 3. 
As an example, a seven per cent tax on fertilisers, 1.54 FIM/kg levy on• 
emissions, or eight per cent tax on silage will ali reduce nitrogen emissions by 
five per cent. The average abatement costs (AAC) for these policy instruments 
range from 14.5 to 71.8 FIM/kg per abated kilo of nitrogen, and the loss of 
profit ranges between FIM 102 and FIM 451 per hectare. 
The general conclusion from the table is that, of the three instruments, a tax 
on nitrogen is more cost-effective than either a levy on nitrogen surplus or a tax 
on the output. This can be seen either from the lower AAC or from the lower 
loss of profit at the corresponding abatement level. To achieve the goal of a 
30% reduction19 in the nitrogen runoffs, as proposed earlier, the change in the 
profit is about FIM 4,930 lower in taxing the inputs than in the case of a levy 
based on the nitrogen surplus, and about FIM 2,430 lower in the case of the 
output tax. 
At lower levels of abatement, i.e. up to 15%, the levy system is more cost-
effective than the output tax system. However, e.g. at a 30% level the output tax 
reduces profit about FIM 2,500 less than the levy system. The levy on nitrogen 
surplus has to be very high to yield more than 25% abatement levels - in fact, so 
high that the profit diminishes to negative at the range of 20-25% abatement in 
many cases. 
19 The results of the 30% level of abatement must, however, be considered only as trend-setting, 
because at individual farm level the optimum could not be found in a few cases, which lowers 
the average values of the level in question presented in the tables of this section. 
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The average abatement costs are also smallest in the input tax option. This 
means that reaching the desired pollution abatement is the least expensive under 
the input tax option. In addition, the farms having a low nitrogen surplus had a 
smaller than average difference of profit decrease between the two instruments. 
The AAC for a nutrient surplus levy increases steadily as the abatement 
level increases, which is a logical result. The initial 5% abatement of runoffs is 
cheaper to conduct than to abate e.g. 30% of them. However, in the case of a tax 
on inputs the AAC first increases, but at the 25% abatement level it starts to 
decrease. The AAC for the output tax behaves similarly. The same phenomenon 
was also encountered in Lankoski' s (1996) study. The reason for this stems 
from the price relationship between the inputs and outputs. At a certain abate-
ment level (price level of fertilisers) it is not worthwhile for a farmer to increase 
inputs but reducing of them increases the profit, i.e. the production elasticity 
becomes smaller than one. More formal proof of this is presented in Annex 4. 
However, the question whether it is valid to levy ali nitrogen surplus when 
the farmer cannot very much control the amount of nitrogen that is lost from the 
manure during storing and spreading can he raised. A case in which a threshold 
value of nitrogen surplus was allowed was also analysed. The results showed 
that this allowance of nitrogen surplus needs to he about 80-110 kg/ha (i.e. from 
60% to 85% of the surplus) to yield the same economic effects on farm profit as 
the tax system. These are very high figures, considering that the average nitro-
gen surplus of these 17 farms was 130 kg/ha. However, if the net surface 
balance and its average 30% of non-available nitrogen is used, a smaller 30% to 
45% allowance is needed. 
A sensitivity analysis in respect of silage price was conducted accordingly. 
Table 16 shows the results if the price of silage is 10% higher (i.e. 0.33 FIM/kg) 
than in the base model. The results are similar to the base scenario. Naturally, 
the tax and levy rates have to he higher in order to achieve the same results as 
previously, which, in turn, has an even higher effect on the profit. Again, a tax 
on nitrogen fertiliser stands out as the most cost-effective policy measure of 
these three alternatives. An output tax, in this scenario, becomes more cost-
effective compared to a nutrient surplus levy already at the 15% abatement 
level. 
Furthermore, the case where the silage price decreases 10% was also ana-
lysed. The situation is quite similar to the base scenario in respect of the policy 
ranking by the cost-efficiency criterion. The levels of taxes and the levy are a 
little lower, and so are the average abatement costs and profit loss, compared to 
the base scenario. 
Finally, the stochastic changes of yields were allowed to take place. The 
average yields of silage during the past 11 years in Kainuu region were used to 
estimate the variation coefficient for the silage yield. From 1986 to 1996 the 
yields of silage varied from 12,600 kg/ha to 20,600 kg/ha. (Omitting any trends 
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Table 1.6. The effect of different policy instruments on silage production on 
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FIM/kg of N 




















5% 1.17 3.18 0.14 22.6 60.3 102.5 -219 -603 -966 
10% 1.55 11.35 0.35 35.6 105.6 133.2 -673 -2,077 -2,418 
15% 1.98 22.39 0.49 38.7 134.7 123.8 -1,090 -3,979 -3,337 
20% 2.46 37.71 0.58 38.8 164.1 110.6 -1,449 -6,495 -3,954 
25% 3.03 46.46 0.63 37.0 155.7 108.6 -1,713 -8,873 -4,641 
30% 3.22 65.62 0.69 36.4 176.2 97.7 -1,874 -11,976 -5,156 
* relative to the original price of nitrogen which, on average, was 7.47 FIM/kg 
* relative to the original price of silage, which was 0.30 FIM/kg 
in the yield, the variation coefficient, which measures the variability in the 
silage yield, was calculated to be 11.9%.) Stochastic silage yields were com-
puted according to the normal probability density function, N(µ,a2), the average 
yield being 16,746 kg/ha, and the standard deviation for the sample being 1,993 
kg/ha. As noted in Section 5.1., the correlation between the nitrogen surplus and 
the cereal yield was found to be about 90%. Therefore, it was assumed that the 
variability in the, silage yields has an additional ±5% stochastic effect on the 
nitrogen surpluses of silage. In addition, the stochastics had an effect on the 
average leaching coefficient indicated by the average nitrogen surplus. 
Two scenarios were run, i.e. the effects of a `bad year' and the effects of a 
`good year' on the cost-efficiency. The farm sample was reduced to six farms. 
`Bad year' means a situation where the yields are low and leakages (nitrogen 
surpluses) are high, and `good year' means a situation where the yields are high 
and leakages low. The results of the bad-year scenario are shown in Table 17. 
The effect of unpropitious weather conditions on the input tax is negligible 
since the only changing factor is the nutrient surplus (Table 15 vs. Table 17). 
The response is of a minor magnitude with respect to the actual level of input 
tax, the AAC, and the loss of profit. As discussed in Section 4.1., the farmer acts 
upon his expectations on normal weather conditions and fertilises accordingly. 
The unfavourable growing conditions have an influence on the yield, but since 
the financial incentive is upon the inputs he uses, the economic implications are 
minor compared to the base situation. 
The policy option on levying the nitrogen surplus, however, is seriously 
influenced by weather. At the initial 5% abatement level the levy almost dou-
bles. The AAC and the loss of profit are also much higher than in the base 
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Table 17. The effect of different policy instruments on silage production on 
Kainuu dairy farms; weather response simulation (bad year). 
abate- 	level of instrument, 	average abatement cost, 	change in profit, 
ment FIM/kg 	 FIM/kg of N 
	
FIM/ha 
input NBCs output input NBCs output input NBCs output 
tax* levy tax** tax levy tax tax levy tax 
5% 1.12 3.01 0.11 20.8 56.6 93.2 -156 -429 -689 
10% 1.45 12.09 0.31 37.6 112.2 138.2 -548 -1,668 -1,984 
15% 1.81 24.16 0.44 41.7 145.1 132.3 -909 -3,233 -2,833 
20% 2.21 40.62 0.54 42.2 176.6 120.0 -1,222 -5,256 -3,414 
25% 2.66 59.96 0.61 40.5 201.3 106.9 -1,460 -7,455 -3,789 
30% 3.00 66.10 0.67 38.8 176.7 97.9 -1,608 -8,507 -3,836 
relative to the original price of nitrogen which, on average, was 7.47 FIM/kg 
relative to the original price of silage, which was 0.30 FIM/kg 
scenario. In this setting, the levy system is more cost-effective than the output 
tax system only below the 10% abatement level. Thus, the ranking of the policy 
instruments by the cost-efficiency criterion can change, if unfavourable weather 
in terms of the growing conditions prevails. Similarly, the effects of prosperous 
growing conditions are shown in Table 18. 
Comparing the two tables above reveals that the effect of weather conditions 
are the most fundamental ones in respect of the NBCs levy. The levels of input 
tax and output tax are the same in both the tables, whereas the nutrient surplus 
Table 18. The effect of different policy instruments on silage production on 
Kainuu dairy farms; weather response simulation (good year). 
abate- 	level of instrument, 	average abatement cost, 	change in profit, 





















5% 1.12 2.05 0.11 14.22 38.6 72.0 -156 -428 -779 
10% 1.45 8.25 0.31 25.63 76.6 107.3 -548 -1,668 -2,254 
15% 1.81 16.49 0.44 28.48 99.0 103.0 -909 -3,233 -3,225 
20% 2.21 27.73 0.54 28.80 120.5 93.6 -1,222 -5,256 -3,897 
25% 2.66 43.33 0.61 27.63 144.7 83.6 -1,460 -7,914 -4,335 
30% 3.00 55.55 0.67 26.50 148.1 76.6 -1,608 -9,219 -4,551 
relative to the original price of nitrogen which, on average, was 7.47 FIM/kg 
relative to the original price of silage, which was 0.30 FIM/kg 
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levy decreases by 30%. In addition, in the case of the input tax the change in 
profit remains the same regardless of the weather effect. The loss of profit in the 
nutrient surplus scheme is in essence the same in both tables. Naturally, the loss 
of profit in the output tax scheme is higher, because the yield levels are higher, 
thus resulting in higher tax payments. 
Average abatement costs are uniformly lower in the good-year scenario than 
in the bad-year scenario. The AACs are about 1/3 lower in a good year than in a 
bad year in the input tax and NBCs levy options. With the output tax option the 
difference is slightly smaller. 
In general, the ranking of these three instruments does not very much change. 
In terms of cost-efficiency criterion the input tax ranks the best. At low levels of 
abatement the nutrient surplus levy is more cost-efficient than output tax, but at 
higher levels of abatement the situation is vice versa. Therefore, we have to 
conclude that the second-best solution, i.e. an input tax, in this scenario setting 
turns out to be better than the first-best policy, i.e. an emission levy based on the 
nutrient balance, according to the cost-efficiency criterion. 
6.5. Which policy instrument to use at a farm level? 
The analyses conducted in the previous section examine the choice of a policy 
instrument solely from the perspective of cost-efficiency. In addition, policy-
makers must use other criteria when choosing 'the right' policy instrument. As 
discussed in Section 4.5. there are many different criteria for the evaluation of 
policy instruments. The selection of the criteria, in turn, affects the choice of the 
policy instrument. The framework presented by Braden and Segerson (1993) 
offers a base structure for assessing different criteria aspects (on page 55). Their 
expression `ability to target' is here re-formulated as site- and time-specificity.' 
Their other two criteria are enforceability and correlation to water quality. 
Following their approach, and including both the cost-efficiency criterion and 
the information dimension criterion, we get Table 19. The cost-efficiency rank-
ing is entered to the table from the results of the modelling scenarios. The 
information dimension is more of a normative assessment, but it is, in most part, 
based on the findings of Lanlcoski (1996) and Tamminen (1997). 
The evaluation of these criteria is — to some extent — a normative task. 
Economists, and other social scientists, simply lack the proper tools to rank 
many of these characteristics quantitatively. Therefore the rankings presented 
here should not be taken as absolute ratings, but rather as a general level of an 
assessment. In the following, each of the three policy instruments scrutinised in 
the previous section is reviewed in terms of the criteria presented in the table 
below. 
Input tax: Even though there seems to be a rather high correlation between 
the nitrogen inputs and their emissions, stochastic factors, such ,as weather, 
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Table 19. Evaluation ofpolicy instruments. 
Policy 	 Rating with respect to 
instrument site- and enforce- correlation 	cost- information 
of principal 	 time- 	ability with water efficiency dimension 
specificity quality 
Input tax 	 L 	H/L 	M 	H 	M 
Emission tax (N-surplus) 	H M M M H 
Output tax 	 L 	H/M 	L 	M 	L 
L means low, M means medium, and H means high rating. 
often interfere with this relationship and result in relatively high variations in 
the emission output. Furthermore, taxes applied to quantities cannot be very 
site- or time-specific. This means that the tax is paid by fertiliser unit regardless 
of where, when, and for which crop the fertiliser unit is used. Enforcing a tax on 
compound fertilisers is an easy task for the principal, since the tax is added to 
the price of the fertiliser. However, in setting a tax on manure the situation 
becomes more complex, because the amount of manure produced on the farm 
needs to he assessed somehow. This is often a difficult task. The cost-efficiency 
of a input tax is the best of these three methods. In addition, the information 
content of the instrument is relatively good, because when facing a tax on input 
the farmer becomes aware of the connections involved in the use of inputs; and 
he also realises the threat his action poses to the environment. However, this 
link may remain unclear, in particular, if the quantity of the input purchased is 
not very closely associated with the amount of pollution emissions generated. 
Emission tax: Because it is based on the nutrient surplus, the emission tax is 
a very site- and time-specific policy instrument. The nutrient balance captures 
the effects of farm level emissions; and if calculated on a parcel level gives 
rather detailed information on the real emission outputs in the production sys-
tem. Even though the nutrient balances are usually calculated at farm level and, 
consequently, the NBCs information does not necessarily reveal the actual 
losses of nutrients to the environment, the information dimension is the highest 
among these three policy instruments. The correlation between emission tax and 
the water quality is obscured by the sometimes unclear link between the nutrient 
surplus and the real nutrient run-offs to watercourses. Cost-efficiency of this 
policy instrument seems to rank second among these three instruments, espe-
cially at lower levels of pollution abatement. However, the administrative costs 
(enforceability) of setting up a system to collect data on nutrient balances for 
taxing purpose can he extensive. And, as discussed in Section 2.5., a levy 
system may intrinsically lead to adverse selection by tempting the farmers to 
`underestimate' the inputs they use and `overestimate' • the outputs that are 
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produced, thus leading to ostensibly low nutrient surpluses, but, in fact, to 
environmentally unpropitious outcome. 
Output tax: The third policy instrument assessed here, the supply oriented 
output tax, ranks highest in terms of enforceability, but this is somewhat am-
biguous. The outputs a farm sells can be easily counted, but the outputs the farm 
uses internally, e.g. silage, are more difficult to assess quantitatively. (The 
situation is similar to the case above when assessing the amount of manure for 
input tax purposes.) The output-based approach can not be easily targeted to 
sensitive areas or times, which means low site- and time-specificity. Further-
more, the output levels are not necessarily related to the water quality problems; 
as it is actually the way the outputs are produced that has the most significant 
impact on the watercourses. Thus, the rankings of the policy instrument, with 
respect to both site- and time-specificity and the correlation to water quality, 
remain low. The cost-efficiency of the instrument is the weakest of these three 
instruments; except in the case of over 20% abatement level, where it ranks 
better than the emission tax. The information dimension of the output tax is low, 
because of its low correlation to the actual water quality. 
As can be seen in table p above, no single policy instrument rates the best in 
terms of ali criteria. Therefore, the principal has to weigh these rankings when 
selecting the proper policy instrument to tackle the agricultural nutrient runoff 
problem. Cost-benefit analysis may be one option for the principal to perform. 
The criteria presented above are, by no means, the only relevant ones. Just as 
the welfare concept Pareto-optimality in itself says nothing about the fairness or 
distribution effects of the solution, the criteria above also lack the discussion of 
the fairness of the policy instruments. The fairness of the policy instrument 
depends on the weather response to production and on other exogenous vari- 
ables. As the farmer cannot control these factors, a policy instrument based on 
the nutrient surplus becomes unjust, because uncontrollable factors may result 
in penalising his production activity regardless of his actions. This is, in es-
sence, the same phenomenon touched earlier in Section 2.3., where it was 
argued that the weather effect on nutrient surplus may screen the true impacts of 
environmental policies, if the impacts are measured by the NBCs. 
7. Conclusions and discussion 
The last two previous chapters above showed first how important a role the 
weather plays in the build-up of the nutrient surpluses, and, secondly, what this 
means in the policy formulation. As noted in Chapter 5, different crops have 
varying levels of nutrient surpluses (and nutrient utilisation). For example, rye 
has, on average, two- to four-fold higher nitrogen surpluses compared to barley 
and oats, whereas potatoes have clearly higher phosphorous surpluses compared 
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to rye, barley, or oats. Therefore, the choice of a crop the farmer cultivates has a 
dramatic effect on the nutrient surpluses. However, we need to remember that 
the nutrient surpluses are also natural phenomena, i.e. the nutrient emissions are 
to some extent unavoidable, and reducing the emissions to zero is impossible. 
At farm level, the options for adjusting the production with respect to the 
weather effects are limited. If a sanction system, e.g. a tax, solely based on the 
nutrient surplus is set, the `naturally' most polluting crops are penalised more 
heavily than the crops with more efficient nutrient utilisation processes. This 
would have an effect on the choice of crops the farmer wishes to cultivate. 
The NBCs seem to be like a double edged sword; i.e. they make it possible to 
assess the farm specific nutrient emissions, but they are obstructed by various 
factors lowering the accuracy and usability of them. However, once these prob-
lems are perceived they can be solved; and, in many cases, it is eventually the 
end use of the NBCs that justifies the way and the precision of the method the 
nutrient balances are calculated with. 
In Chapter 6 an optimisation model was build up to assess dairy farms' 
silage production employing profit maximising approach. The model was cou-
pled with a leaching function, and adjusted with the farm specific nitrogen 
surpluses. The cost-efficiency of three policy instruments, i.e. a tax on a nitro-
gen fertiliser, a levy on the nitrogen surplus (i.e. an effluent tax), or a tax on the 
silage price, was assessed. The results of the model suggest that in terms of the 
cost-efficiency criterion the best policy option to reduce agricultural nitrogen 
runoffs in silage production is setting a tax on fertiliser inputs. This holds true if 
the price of the output changes, and also if the stochastic impacts of the weather 
on the yield and on nutrient utilisation are taken into consideration. The tax on 
output (silage) is in general the least cost-effective of these three policy instru-
ments. However, at high abatement levels of nutrient runoffs, i.e. over 20%, the 
tax on output becomes more cost-effective than the tax on nitrogen surplus. 
These findings slightly contradict those of Fontein et al. (1994) who state 
that a levy on the surplus of nitrogen is a more cost-efficient way to reduce the 
output of nitrogen (emissions) than a levy on feed in pig production. Yet, 
Lankoski' s (1996) results, in modelling grain production, support the findings 
of the present study by noting that the cost-efficiency of different instruments is 
sensitive to the changes in the abatement levels, as well as to initial leakage 
levels. It is obvious that the results of different models depend on the modelling 
structure, and thus they are not fully comparable. 
The variation due to weather factors in yields and nutrient surpluses had a 
rather small effect on the overall cost-efficiency ranking. However, stochastic 
impacts may have an effect on the ranking between the output tax option and 
nutrient surplus levy. The weather impact on the choice of a policy instrument 
seems to be of rather minor importance. In extreme weather conditions, though, 
policy impact assessment utilising the NBCs may become distorted. 
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The modelling of silage production indicated that setting a tax on an input is 
a more cost-efficient way to abate nutrient runoffs than a tax based on nitrogen 
surplus or a tax on silage output. Cost-efficiency is but one criterion, and the 
policymaker then has to assess other criteria in the final policy choice, also. The 
criteria which are selected for the final policy assessment play an important role 
in guiding the decision-making process. 
If the objective is to enhance water quality by reducing agricultural nutrient 
runoffs, the solutions should be very site- and time-specific. Usually, localised 
measures are needed to reach the desired environmental response — first, in the 
agricultural production practice, and, secondly, in the nutrient emissions. Unfor-
tunately, highly differentiated regional or local programmes lead to high trans-
action and administration costs. In addition, policies hindered by information 
problems, such as the measurability problem of nonpoint emissions, give rise to 
adverse selection from the farmers' part, which needs to be accounted for in the 
policy formulation. 
In the light of the discussion on environmental policy measures, it must be 
proposed that a functional environmental policy design needs to respect the 
information advantage the farmers posses on the environmental position of their 
farms. Some economists are already talking about the third phase in the environ-
mental control policies. This means that the conventional command-and-control 
policies (i.e. standards or regulations) or economic instruments are being re-
placed by information policies. 
Ample literature concerning the control of nonpoint pollution has emerged 
during the recent years. Many of these findings advocate some type of incentive 
schemes or farm co-operation in reducing agricultural nutrient runoffs. Quite 
often these models rely on the information qualities of the policy measures (e.g. 
Xepapadeas 1997, Romstad 1997). Farmers' awareness of agri-environmental 
linkages is improved and they can opt for the most suitable methods to reduce 
the pressure their production imposes on the environment. 
Although this study did not attempt to quantify the effect of the information 
dimension, there is evidence (e.g. Tamminen 1997) that `upgrading' farmers' 
knowledge on the environmental issues has made them more apt to carry out 
environmental investments. Bosch et al. (1995) noted that farmers in Nebraska, 
who had received test information of nitrogen from soil fertility tests, were more 
eager to use that information in nitrogen application decisions than farmers with 
no soil testing information. Berentsen and Giesen (1997) also emphasise the 
role of information measures in the nutrient runoff abatement policies. Conse-
quently, more emphasis needs to be addressed to the information content of the 
policy measures. But what can we say for policy recommendations? 
The present Finnish Agri-Environmental Programme (FAEP) is mainly a 
uniform programme where the criteria are only to some extent differentiated by 
region (e.g. the fertilising base levels, and the green cover criterion). The new 
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FAEP will be introduced in 2000. Further development of the FAEP requires 
more attention to site-specific criteria and to the information dimension of the 
measures. For example, the green cover criterion ‘is 30% for ali farms in South-
ern Finland (areas A and B), regardless of the proximity to watercourses. This 
means that farms must have at least 30% of the arable land area covered by 
plants or plant residues outside the growing season, or an approved method of 
reduced tillage must be used (MMM 1994). Therefore, the farms located further 
away from the watercourses face the same requirement as the farms having a 
direct connection to rivers, lakes, or the sea. In addition, adverse selection has 
taken place when farmers have started to cultivate by means of reduced tillage 
which in its heavy form very much approaches ploughing. Compared to plough-
ing, reduced tillage seems to increase the risk of erosion and the drifting of 
soluble phosphorous to watercourses (Turtola 1997). 
The present FAEP presents several criteria for farmers to fulfil in order to be 
eligible for a compensatory payment. This is a very regulatory approach. An 
information policy approach would be to introduce the environmental goals and 
the means for attaining the goals by providing the farmers with knowledge and 
know-how on the ways to improve the environmental efficiency of their farms. 
Nutrient balance calculations provide one way in which this efficiency can be 
assessed both at the farm level and at a more general level. Thus, the NBCs 
information serves both the farmer and the policymaker in assessing the envi-
ronmental impacts of the programme. However, the limitations of the calcula-
tions must be recognised and accounted for. 
Presently, information policies are used in connection with other environ-
mental policy instruments, but the information policy approach has started to 
gain more importance as a policy measure in itself. The information policy 
approach needs much more integration between the farmer, extension services, 
and administration. It is a challenging approach, but overcomes some problems 
that obstruct the use of more direct policy instruments. Although there may be 
scepticism concerning the efficacy of the information policy approach, it is 
clear that this approach leaves more options for the farmer to choose from in the 
nutrient runoff abatement; and maybe the farmer knows something the 
policymaker does not know about the feasible ways, for his part, to contribute to 
a better, cleaner environment. 
8. Summary 
Agricultural impacts on the environment in Finland are manifold. These impacts 
can be both positive (e.g. landscape and biodiversity) or negative (e.g. nutrient 
run-offs and erosion). These are also called the positive or the negative exter-
nalities of production. Agriculture is a sector contributing the most to the 
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nitrogen and phosphorous runoffs to watercourses, compared to the other sec-
tors of the Finnish society. Other sectors, such as industries, have been able to 
reduce nutrient emissions by applying cleansing mechanisms or procedures to 
their production systems. This has been possible because the emissions, e.g. in 
industrial processes, emanate from certain distinct sources, i.e. the pollution 
comes from a point source origin. However, agricultural nutrient runoffs are 
mainly of nonpoint origin. This means that it is not possible to point out where 
the runoffs measured in ambient concentration originate from, once they have 
leached from the arable land to the watercourses. Consequently, it is not possi-
ble to point at the true polluters of the watercourses, even though the rising 
nutrient content is observed. This makes the agri-environmental policy design 
more challenging. 
This research studied the possibilities of reducing agricultural nutrient emis-
sions to the environment by means of different policy instruments. These policy 
instruments can he categorised as economic instruments, direct regulations, and 
information policy. Much of the past research emphasis has been on studying 
the optimal solutions to environmental problems by using economic instruments 
or standards in the agri-environmental policy design. However, the role of 
information policies as a control instrument in itself is rising; and the nutrient 
balance calculations (the NBCs) can also be seen in that light. 
In general, the NBCs imply the difference between the nutrients entering and 
the nutrients leaving an agricultural system, typically resulting in a surplus of 
nutrients. The two most widely used methods to calculate the NBCs are the farm 
gate balance and the surface balance. The NBCs are used for different purposes, 
e.g. for farm production planning or at regional and national level for assessing 
the impact of agriculture on the environment, as well as the effect of agri-
environmental policies on agricultural nutrient runoffs. Thus, interest in assess-
ing the agricultural impact on the environment with the NBCs is growing. 
The nutrient balance calculations can he seen as a way to inspect farm 
pollution (nutrient runoffs) from the point source perspective. Thus, the tradi-
tional nonpoint aspect of agricultural pollution is avoided, and conventional 
environmental control policies can he directed to the polluting discharges. As 
charming as this seems, we should not make hasty assumptions on the feasibility 
of the NBCs in environmental control policies before scrutinising the problems 
which hinder the use of the NBCs as well. 
One major obstacle in using the nutrient balance calculations in agri-envi-
ronmental policy is that the NBCs do not convey the information about where 
the nutrients leave to from the agricultural system. The NBCs just state and 
quantify the situation but do not reveal whether the nutrients accumulate to the 
soil, leach to watercourses, or volatile into the air. Therefore, if such a policy 
measure based on the nutrient balance calculation is set up, the specific environ-
mental effects, e.g. with respect to the water quality, may remain unclear. 
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Perhaps even more importantly, the weather plays an important role in the 
agricultural production process in the northern latitudes. Crop yields, and conse- 
quently the nutrient surpluses, vary considerably in Finland because of the 
northern climate. For example, the year 1987 was very poor for crop growth in 
Finland and the nutrient uptake was 30% lower than in the previous year, thus 
resulting in high nutrient surpluses (on average 97 kg/ha). 
Furthermore, there are difficulties related to the accuracy of the NBCs. 
These include e.g. the accuracy of the coefficients used to assess the amount of 
nutrients in the animal manure and in the nutrient uptake by crops. 
In addition, the purpose for which the NBCs are used is reflected in the 
accuracy of the calculations. If farmers feel the NBCs give them new and 
relevant information for improving the effectiveness of nutrient use, they will 
provide accurate information for the NBCs. However, if they feel that the NBCs 
are used in penalising their farms, the information aspect is shadowed by the 
strategic behaviour of reporting the NBCs as low as possible. 
The sensitivity of crop response to weather conditions leads to similar re-
sponses with respect to the nutrient surplus. An analysis of the variation of 
nutrient surpluses in different crops showed that Finnish nitrogen surpluses may 
vary considerably from year to year. Potatoes and oats, in particular, are very 
sensitive to night frost, and if such a thing happens that easily leads to high 
nutrient surpluses. The temperature, especially in August, is significant for the 
build-up of nutrient surpluses, The higher the degree-days in August is the 
lower is the nutrient surplus, and the better the nutrients are utilised. The data 
also suggested that proper precipitation is significant for the build-up of the 
nutrient surpluses. Excessive rain in May and August, in particular, result in 
high nutrient surpluses. Thus, cold summer and wet May and August usually 
lead to high nutrient losses. However, phosphorous surpluses are much more 
stable than nitrogen surpluses with respect to weather factors. 
Farm economic indicators were compared to the nitrogen surpluses of Kainuu 
dairy farms. The results suggest a clear link between the cost structure and the 
nitrogen surpluses. The correlations are positive (i.e. between 0.56 and 0.65 in 
the case of total costs) meaning that high costs per hectare result in high 
nitrogen surpluses and, consequently, high nutrient emissions to the environ-
ment. In other words, the lower production costs coincide with efficient nitro-
gen use. The main component contributing to a high con-elation was found to be 
the cost of fertilisers. The correlations were in the range of 0.64 to 0.69, 
depending on the nitrogen surplus category. Therefore, farms having low ferti-
liser cost also have low nutrient surpluses. In addition, there seems to be a 
tendency that larger farms are, on average, more efficient in using the nutrients 
measured by the cattle balance. 
In addition to the statistical analyses a profit maximising optimisation model 
was build up. Farm level comparison of the cost-efficiency of input tax, emis- 
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sion levy (based on the NBCs) and output tax showed that in silage production 
where farm uses both commercial fertilisers and manure, the tax on nitrogen is, 
in general, the most cost-efficient one in abating nitrogen leakage. An emission 
levy exhibited higher cost-efficiency than output tax at low abatement levels. 
The effect of weather conditions on the cost-efficiency ranking showed that 
if the weather is unfavourable for crop growth the emission tax is more cost-
effective than output tax only at 10% abatement level. Input tax is by far the 
most cost-efficient policy instrument of these three even under stochastic weather 
effects. If growing conditions turn out to be better than normal, the ranking does 
not change. However, the relative efficiency of all three policy instruments 
improves, i.e. the average abatement costs decrease. 
The final choice of a policy instrument is a matter of many perspectives, 
cost-efficiency being one of them. In addition, criteria such as how easily the 
instrument is enforced, and how time- and site-specific the environmental re-
sponses are, play an important role in the final policy ranking. Furthermore, the 
information dimension also has to be considered in the policy choice. The better 
the policy instrument communicates information both to the farmer and the 
policymaker, the more willing the farmer (the agent) is to provide as precise as 
possible data on the true impact his production has on the environment, and the 
better the policymaker (the principal) is conscious of the results of the policy it 
has established. With this respect, the NBCs provide the best information di-
mension. 
The NBCs can be viewed as a way to simplify the use of the command-and-
control policy measures. Instead of setting up multiple regulations aiming at 
improving the environmental effects of farming practises, calculating the nutri-
ent surpluses gives a simple assessment on the impact a farm has on the environ-
ment. Then, it is up to the farmer to decide what to do to ameliorate the nutrient 
use efficiency at his farm. 
The NBCs are already used in agri-environmental policy, e.g. The Nether-
lands is moving to a system where farms face a financial sanction based on the 
farm' s nutrient surplus of phosphate. The Dutch approach is understandable 
because of the scale of the excess-nutrient problem. In Finland, however, levy-
ing the surpluses is a too strong of a procedure. Levying emissions does not 
seem to be very feasible policy instrument because of its low cost-efficiency. 
The nutrient balance calculations can give important information to farmers 
and administration on the impacts agriculture has on the environment. The 
accuracy and feasibility of this information depends on many different factors. 
These factors must be taken into consideration in calculating the nutrient bal-
ances, and before using the information of the NBCs at farm level, or for agri-
environmental policy formulation. 
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SELOSTUS 
Ravinnetaseet maatalouden ympäristöpolitiikassa 
Reijo Pirttijärvi 
Maataloustuotannon ympäristövaikutukset ovat moninaisia. Nämä vaikutukset 
voidaan luokitella joko positiivisiksi, kuten maaseutumaiseman kokeminen ja 
biodiversiteetin lisääntyminen, tai negatiivisiksi, kuten ravinnehuuhtoumat ja 
eroosio. Tässä yhteydessä taloustieteilijät puhuvat positiivisista ja negatiivisista 
ulkoisvaikutuksista. Maatalous on tätä nykyä suurin vesistöjen ravinnekuormitusta 
aiheuttava yksittäinen sektori. Muut yhteiskunnan sektorit ovat kyenneet 
vähentämään ravinnekuormitustaan asentamalla päästöjään pienentämään erilaisia 
puhdistusmekanismeja. Tämä on ollut mahdollista koska esimerkiksi teollisuuden 
päästöt ovat luonteeltaan pistekuormitusta, jonka kontrolli on tällä tapaa mah-
dollista. Maatalouden ravinnepäästöt ovat kuitenkin pääosin hajakuormitusta, 
jonka mittaaminen ja kontrollointi on paljon hankalampaa. Nämä hajakuor-
mituksen mittaamiseen ja kuormittajan tunnistamiseen liittyvät vaikeudet ovatkin 
johtaneet siihen, että periaatteessa tehokkaimpia päästöihin kohdistuvia ympä-
ristöpoliittista toimenpiteitä ei ole voitu toteuttaa. 
Ympäristöongelmiin on yleensä puututtu joko 1) hintaohjauksen (esiin. vero-
jen) tai 2) määräohjauksen (esim. ympäristönormien asettaminen) välineillä. 
Eräät taloustieteilijät ovat kuitenkin alkaneet puhua ympäristöohjauskeinojen 
kolmannesta aallosta, jolla tarkoitetaan 3) tiedollista ohjausta. Tiedollinen ohja-
us (eli informaatio-ohjaus) on aiemmin mielletty kahta edellistä tukevaksi ja 
täydentäväksi toimenpiteeksi, mutta se on alkanut nyttemmin saada jalansijaa 
myös itsenäisenä ohjauskeinonaan. Tiedollisen ohjauksen tarkoituksena on vai-
kuttaa ihmisten asenteisiin ja käyttäytymiseen välittämällä heille kohdennettua 
ympäristön tilaa koskevaa tietoa, ja näin saada aikaan muutosta heidän käyttäyty-
misessään ympäristön suhteen. 
Perinteisesti maatalouden kuormituksen on nähty olevan pääosin haja-
kuormitusta, mutta ravinnetaselaskelmat tarjoavat mahdollisuuden tarkastella 
maatalouden ympäristökuormitusta pistekuormituksen näkökulmasta. Ravinne-
taselaskelmilla mitataan tuotantoprosessiin käytetyissä panoksissa tulevien ja 
lopputuotteisiin sitoutuneiden ravinnemäärien erotusta. Tyypillisesti tämä ero-
tus osoittaa ravinneylijäämien syntyä eli tuotantoprosessiin on tullut enemmän 
ravinteita kuin sieltä on lähtenyt. Taselaskelman lopputulos ilmoitetaan yleensä 
peltohehtaaria kohden (kg/ha) tai tuotos-panos —suhteena (hyötyprosentti). 
Tämä tutkimus tarkasteli maatalouden ravinnetaseiden käyttöä ympäristö-
kuormituksen vähentämisessä. Ravinnetaseiden avulla saadaan käsitys siitä, missä 
määrin maatila (tai yleisemmin laajempikin tuotantokokonaisuus) kykenee hyö- 
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dyntämään tilalle tulevia ravinteita ja missä määrin ne kulkeutuvat ohi varsinai-
sen tuotantoprosessin. 
Ravinnetaselaskelmien käyttö on yleistymässä tuotannon suunnittelussa. Ti-
lan ravinnevirtoja kuvaavat laskelmat voivatkin antaa tilanjohdolle arvokasta 
tietoa tuotannon suunnitteluun. Myös hallinnon piirissä on herännyt kiinnostus 
ravinnetaselaskelmia kohtaan. Viranomaiset toivovat saavansa laskelmista tie-
toa ympäristöpolitiikan vaikutuksista, esimerkiksi maatalouden ympäristötuki-
ohj elmaa arvioitaessa. 
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkasteltiin ravinnetaselaskelmien metodologiaa, ravin-
netaseisiin liittyvää tutkimusta sekä taselaskelmiin liittyviä ongelmia. Tase-
laskelmia on olemassa lähinnä kolme eri päätyyppiä: 1) ravinteiden porttitase, 
2) peltotase ja 3) karjatase. Ravinnevirtojen tarkastelupisteet ovat näissä joko 
tilan portilla (panosten ostot — tuotteiden myynnit), peltopinnalla (kasviravinteet 
— sato) tai karjarakennuksessa (eläinten rehut — eläintuotteet). 
Ravinnetaseisiin liittyy kuitenkin kaksi perusongelmaa, jotka vaikeuttavat 
ravinnetaseinformaation käyttöä ympäristöpolitiikan työkaluna. Ensinnäkin 
ravinnetaselaskelma, joka yleensä osoittaa tilalta muodostuvan ravinneylijäämiä, 
ei kerro sitä minne ravinteet joutuvat. Ravinnetaselaskelma vain toteaa ravinne-
ylijäämien olemassaolon, mutta ei ota kantaa siihen joutuvatko ravinteet vesis-
töön, haihtuvatko ne ilmaan vain jäävätkö ne maaperään. Näin ollen, mikäli 
asetetaan ravinneylijäämiin kohdistuva ympäristöpoliittinen toimenpide (esim. 
maksu tai vero), ei voida olla varmoja siitä missä määrin maatalouden ravinne-
päästöt vesistöihin todella pienenevät. 
Toiseksi, säätekijät vaikuttavat Suomen oloissa merkittävästi ravinneyli-
jäämien syntyyn. Satotasot (ja siten ravinneylijäämät) vaihtelevat Suomessa 
pohjoisen ilmaston vuoksi huomattavasti. Esimerkiksi vuoden 1987 kasvukauden 
sääolot olivat erityisen epäedulliset, jolloin kasvien typen hyödyntämisen taso 
oli 30 % pienempi kuin edellisenä vuonna. Ravirmeylijäämät olivat tuona vuon-
na poikkeuksellisen körkeita (keskimäärin 97 kg/ha). 
Ravinnetaselaskemisen tarkkuuteen vaikuttaa se, kuinka tarkkoja kertoimia 
on käytössä. Esimerkiksi peltotasetta laskettaessa lannan ravinnemäärien oi-
kealla arvioinnilla on keskeinen merkitys laskelman lopputuloksen kannalta. 
Myös sadossa poistuvien ravinnemäärien arviointi vaikuttaa laskelmaan keskei-
sesti. 
Se, mihin ravinnetaselaskelmia käytetään, heijastuu myös taselaskelmien 
tarkkuuteen ja luotettavuuteen. Jos viljelijät kokevat saavansa taselaskelmista 
hyödyllistä tietoa tilansa tuotannon suunnitteluun ja seurantaan, he pyrkivät 
tekemään laskelmat mahdollisimman luotettavasti ja tarkasti. Jos viljelijät pel-
käävät ravinnetaseinformaatiota käytettävän heidän tuotantonsa kontrollointiin 
(esim. ravinnetasevero), viljelijöiden strateginen käyttäytyminen häivyttää tase-
laskelmien informaatioulottuvuuden, kun viljelijät pyrkivät ilmoittamaan las-
kennalliset ravinneylijäämät mahdollisimman pieninä. 
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Varianssianalyysi eri kasvien (ohra, kaura, ruis ja peruna) suhteen osoitti, 
että ravinneylijäämät vaihtelevat 11 vuoden ajanjaksolla melkoisesti erityisesti 
perunan ja kauran suhteen, jotka ovat hallanarkoja viljelykasveja. Säätekijöiden 
vaikutus fosforiylijäämien syntyyn on kuitenkin typpiylijäämien syntyä vähäi-
sempää. Tutkimus osoitti, että erityisesti toukokuun sademäärillä ja elokuun 
lämpötiloilla on keskeinen merkitys ravinneylijäämien syntyyn. Säätekijöillä on 
kuitenkin kaksijakoinen vaikutus kasvien ravinteiden hyödyntämisessä. Toisaal-
ta liian märkä ja toisaalta liian kuiva toukokuu saavat aikaan saman suuntaisen 
vaikutuksen ravinteiden hyödyntämisessä (korkea ravinneylijäämä ja alhainen 
hyötyprosentti). Niin ikään kuuman tai kylmän sään vallitessa kasvien ravinteiden 
hyödyntämiskyky heikkenee. Lämpötilasummalla on sademäärää merkittävämpi 
vaikutus ravinteiden hyödyntämisessä. Toisin sanoen tutkitut neljä kasvia ovat 
herkempiä reagoimaan ravinteiden hyödyntämiseen lämpötilasta johtuvien teki-
jöiden vaikutuksesta kuin sademäärien muutosten vaikutuksesta. 
Tutkittaessa Kainuun maitotiloilla tilan taloudellisten indikaattorien ja typpi-
ravinneylijäämien suhdetta aineistosta löytyi joitakin tilastollisesti merkitseviä 
riippuvuuksia. Korkeat tuotantokustannukset (mk/ha) korreloivat voimakkaasti 
korkeiden ravinneylijäämien (kg/ha) kanssa (korrelaatio r = 0.56 - 0.65). Erityi-
sesti lannoitekustannus korreloi varsin vahvasti ravinneylijäämän kanssa 
(r = 0.64 - 0.69). Näin ollen tilat, joilla on alhainen lannoitekustannus, omaavat 
myös alhaisen ravinneylijäämän typen osalta. Lisäksi kävi ilmi, että kooltaan 
suuremmat tilat näyttävät olevan hieman tehokkaampia ravinteiden hyödyntäjiä 
karjataseen hyötyprosentilla mitattuna. 
Tilastollisten analyysien ohella tutkimuksessa tarkasteltiin optimointimallien 
avulla tilannetta, jossa tila käyttää sekä ostolannoitetta että tilan omaa karjan-
lantaa säilörehun tuottamiseen, ja tilan tuotantoon kohdistuu typpipäästöjen 
vähennykseen tähtäävä taloudellinen ohjauskeino. Optimointimalleissa tutkit-
tiin kolmen ohjauskeinon (panosvero, päästövero eli ravinneylijäämävero ja 
tuotevero) kustannustehokkuutta pyrittäessä pienentämään maatilan typpipäästöjä 
5-30 prosenttia. 
Tulosten mukaan typpipanokseen kohdistuva vero oli näistä kolmesta kus-
tannustehokkain kaikilla päästövähennystasoilla. Toisin sanoen pyrittäessä alle 
30 prosentin typpipäästöjen vähentämiseen sekä typen ravinnetaselaskelmaan 
perustuva päästövero että säilörehun määrään kohdistuva vero aiheuttavat kor-
keammat tulonmenetykset kuin typpipanokseen kohdistuva maksu. Säilörehun 
määrään kohdistuva lopputuotevero on pääsääntöisesti päästöveroa tehottomampi 
keino, mutta on yli 20 prosentin päästövähennystä tavoiteltaessa tätä tehok-
kaampi. 
Lisäksi tarkasteltiin säästä johtuvien satoon, ja siten myös ravinnetaseisiin 
vaikuttavien satunnaistekijöiden vaikutusta suhteelliseen kustannustehokkuuteen. 
Kasvukauden huono sää pienentää satomääriä ja nostaa siten ravinneylijäämiä. 
Säätekijöillä ei kuitenkaan ollut kovin suurta vaikutusta eri ohjauskeinojen suh- 
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teelliseen kustannustehokkuuteen. Huonon kasvukauden sattuessa tuoteveron 
kustannustehokkuus paranee hieman suhteessa päästöveroon, mutta se on silti 
alle 10 prosentin päästövähennystavoitteella päästöveroa huonompi. Hyvän kasvu-
kauden sattuessa kaikkien ohjanskeinojen kustannustehokkuus paranee. 
Kustannustehokkuus ei -kuitenkaan ole ainoa kriteeri, jolla ympäristöpolitii-
kan ohjauskeinoja voidaan arvioida. Muiksi keskeisiksi kriteereiksi nousevat 
ohjauskeinon kyky saavuttaa sille asetettuja tavoitteita ajallisesti ja paikallisesti, 
ohjauskeinon hallinnollinen toteutettavuus, ohjauskeinon korrelaatio veden laa-
dun suhteen sekä ohjauskeinon informaatioulottuvuus. Mikään tutkimuksessa 
tarkastellusta kolmesta ohjauskeinosta ei kaikkien näiden kriteerien suhteen 
nouse yksiselitteisesti muita paremmaksi. Näin ollen päätöksentekijän tulee 
punnita tarkkaan eri kriteerien painoarvoja ohjauskeinoa valittaessa. 
Tutkimuksessa pyrittiin erityisesti painottamaan informaation merkitystä 
politiikkatoimenpiteen valinnassa. Maatalouden hajakuormituksen kontrolliin 
on esitetty viime aikoina monia lupaavia ohjauskeinoratkaisuja. Monessa tapauk-
sessa informaation luonteella on keskeinen merkitys ohjauskeinon toimivuuden 
kannalta. Ohjauskeinon tulee ottaa huomioon se, että viljelijällä on yleensä 
tarkempi tieto tilansa ympäristövaikutuksista, kun taas säätelijällä on parempi 
tieto tarvittavista päästövähennyksistä. Mitä paremmin ohjauskeino välittää tie-
toa sekä viljelijälle että säätelijälle sitä tarkemmin viljelijä laskee tilakohtaisen 
ravinnetaseen ja sitä paremmin säätelijä saa mahdollisimman tarkan tiedon ase-
tettujen politiikkatoimenpiteiden vaikuttavuudesta. Tässä suhteessa ravinne-
taseeseen perustuva ohjauskeino on kaikkein informatiivisin. 
Ravinnetaselaskelmat Voidaan myös nähdä keinona yksinkertaistaa suoraan 
säätelyyn pohjaavaa hallinnollista ohjausperinnettä. Monimutkaisten viljely-
menetelmiä koskevien säädösten (kuten ympäristötukijärjestelmä) asemesta maa-
talouden ympäristötavoitteiden toteutumista voitaisiin tarkastella ravinnetase-
laskelmien avulla. Ravinnetaseita käytetään jo nykyään ympäristöpolitiikan työ-
kaluna; esimerkiksi Hollannissa ollaan ottamassa käyttöön fosfaattiylijäämiin 
pohjaava tilakohtainen maksujärjestelmä. Hollannin järjestelmä on ymmärrettä-
vä Maan ravinneylijäämäongelman laajuuden näkökulmasta käsin. Suomeen tä-
mäntyyppinen ratkaisu on liian voimakas, eikä se tämän tutkimuksen valossa 
näytä Suomeen sovellettuna olevan ratkaisuna kovin kustannustehokaskaan. 
Alueellisten tai maakohtaisten ravinnetaseiden laskeminen tasaa jossain määrin 
tilatasolla tapahtuneet pellonkäyttöön liittyvät vaihtelut, ja siten voidaan tehdä 
arvioita ympäristöpoliittisten toimenpiteiden vaikuttavuudesta. Säätekijöistä 
johtuvat stokastiset ravinneylijäämien vaihtelut jäävät silti jäljelle. Näin ollen 
eri vuosien lukuarvot eivät ole suoraan verrannollisia keskenään, mutta ne antavat 
keskiarvotasolla kuvan kehityssuurmasta. 
Ravinnetaseiden käyttö ympäristöpolitiikan yleistyökaluna on ongelmallista, 
sillä tilakohtaiset tekijät vaikuttavat ratkaisevalla tavalla ravinneylijäämien syn-
tyyn. Tilan viljelykasvi, viljelykierto, maaperän ominaisuudet ja sääolot muutta- 
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vat vuosittain samankin tilan ravinneylijäämiä varsin • paljon. Näin ollen .eri 
vuosien ravinneylijäämien -vertailu ei ole kovin mielekästä, ja vielä vähemmän 
mielekästä on vertailla eri tiloja saati sitten eri tuotantosuuntien tiloja keske-
nään. Parhaiten ravinnetaseet soveltuvat tilakohtaiseen ravinnevirtojen seuran-
taan yhdistettynä muuhun tuotannon suunnitteluun ja seurantaan. Tällöin tase-
laskelma tuottaa viljelijälle tietoa ravinteiden .käyttöön liittyvistä ongelma-
kohdista. Ravinnetaselaskelmat toimivat näin ollen tiedollisen ohjauksen työ-
välineenä. Todettuaan ravinteiden käytössä ongelmakohtia on viljelijän sitten 
itsensä päätettävissä, mitä tilalla tulee tehdä päästöjen pienentämiseksi. Tämä 
on haastava lähestymistapa, ja se jättää paljon vastuuta tutkimukselle ja neuvon-
nalle välittää viljelijälle oikeaa tietoa tilalle soveltuvista ja käyttökelpoisista 
ratkaisuvaihtoehdoista. 
Ravinnetaselaskelmat voivat välittää tärkeää tietoa sekä viljelijälle että hal-
linnolle maatalouden ympäristövaikutuksista. Tämän tiedon tarkkuus ja käyttö-
kelpoisuus riippuu monista tekijöistä. Nämä tekijät tulee ottaa huomioon tase-
laskelmia tehtäessä ja käytettäessä laskelmista saatua tietoa tilan tuotannon 
suunnitteluun ja ympäristöpolitiikan työkaluna politiikkatoimenpiteiden vaiku-
tusten arvioinnissa 
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Annex 1. The production of nutrients by animal type and crop type 
in Finland. 
Nutrient supply from organic manure (kg/year) by species in Finland. 
Animal Manure nutrient coefficients kg/year 
- P 	P205 
Milking cow 100 18 41 
Sucker cow 55 9 21 
Heifer 37 7 16 
Calves (< 8 months) 25 3.5 8 
Bovine animal >1 year 40 7 16 
Sow with piglets 40 9 23 
Pigs (by fattening place) 11 2.5 6 
Horse 65 10 23 
Pony 45 7 16 
Sheep, goat 17 3.5 8 
Laying hen 0.5 0.2 0.5 
Broiler 0.3 0.05 0.11 
Source: Own calculations. 
Nutrient uptake by cultivated crops in Finland. 
Plant Nutrients in plant weight, kg/100 kg 
P205 
Winter wheat 20 3.4 7.8 
Spring wheat 21 3.4 7.8 
Rye 18 3.4 7.8 
Barley 17 3.5 8.0 
Oats 18 3.5 8.0 
Mixed cereal 20 3.5 8.0 
Pea 34 3.8 8.7 
Potatoes 3.5 0.5 1.1 
Sugar beet 2.0 0.35 0.8 
Dry hay 19 2.4 5.5 
Silage 5.5 0.6 1.3 
Clover seed 15 2.2 5.0 
Timothy seed 15 2.2 5.0 
Turnip rape 37 8.6 19.7 
Rape 37 9.0 20.6 
Straw 6 1.0 2.3 
Source: Tuoli et al. 1996. 
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Annex 2. 
Weitzman (1974) presents in his classic article that if benefit uncertainty and 
cost uncertainty are simultaneously present, and if costs are not independently 
distiibuted the comparative advantage of price instrument over a quantity instru-
ment is given by: 
(16) 	 Apq 02C B 2C "2 4- CP2 c B"/ 2C" ; 
where Apq = the net welfare advantage of the price instrument, 
relative to the quantity instrument; 
= the slope of marginal benefit function, the second 
derivative of the total benefit function, B; 
= the slope of the marginal cost function, the second 
derivative of the total cost function, C; 
2c= the variance of costs; 
and the sign is used to represent an accurate local approximation (Stavins 
1996). Thus, the curvatures of abatement cost and benefit functions determine 
whether incentive or regulatory instruments are more robust when applied to 
local circumstances (Braden and Segerson 1993). 
Q Q* Q T 1 TP emission reduction 
Figure 19. Cost uncertainty and the choice ofpolicy instrument. Source: Stavins 
1996. 
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Figure 19 shows a situation where the expected marginal costs (MCE) of 
emission reduction differ from the realised marginal costs (MCR). T is the price 
instrument, i.e. a tax, set to achieve the expected social optimum (D) in emis-
sion reduction, and gn, is the amount of tradable permits (quality instrument). 
However, as the real marginal costs are greater than what expected (i.e. MC 
shifts to left), the ex post optimum turns out to he at Q:. In this example, it is 
clear that the social loss with the tax option at QT is much smaller (shaded 
triangle ABC) than with the tradable permit option at Qrp (shaded triangle 
CDE). Thus, instrument superiority is a relationship between the expected and 
realised cost functions and the relative slopes of MC and MB, as formulated in 
equation ( 1 6) . Therefore, if the policymaker lacks the knowledge of the costs of 
emission reduction, the tax system is likely to lead to smaller welfare loss than 
setting standards, especially in case of steeply sloped marginal cost curves. 
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Annex 3. Variables and parameter values used in the silage 
production model. 
Price levels are from 1994. 
price of silage = pq = 0.30 FIM/kg 
price of nitrogen in fertilisers = wf = 7.47 FIM/kg, [6.58,10.28] kg/ha 
price of nitrogen in manure = w. = 4.13 FIM/kg, [3.25,6.95] kg/ha 
average leakage = Y = 130.0 kg/ha; average nitrogen surplus of the 17 farms 
average fertilising for silage = A = 200 kg N/ha 
yield function for silage Q =f(X); b + 21.6Xf m - 0.0341Xf m2, 
where b = an adjustment parameter 'from each farm' (difference to 3164 
from the Heikkilä's yield function), and 
Xf m = the amount of fertiliser applied (fertiliser and manure) 
leakage functio'n for nitrogen; L(N) = d + Yeu(Nf -1) + Y(4.6 eu(Nm -1)-1.8), 
where d = an adjustment parameter from each farm (i.e. the difference 
of the farm specific nitrogen surplus to the average nitrogen 
surplus, Y) 
Nf = Xf/A, the amount of fertiliser nitrogen used with respect to 
the average use of nitrogen 
Nm = Xm/A, the amount of manure nitrogen used with respect to 
the average use of nitrogen 
for fertiliser tax (tf ) the profit it is; 
Tc(Xf,m) = pq(b + 21.6Xf,m - 0.0341Xf,m2) - (t1 +1) wf,n, Xf,m 
the effect of changing the level of fertilising is the derivative of the function 
above, i.e.; 
drc / d Xfm., = pq(21.6 - 0.0682Xf,m) - (tf +1)Zwf,m 
for levy on nitrogen surplus (t2) the profit Tt is; 
Tc(Xfm) = pq(b + 21.6Xf,m - 0.0341Xf,m2) - Zwf,m Xf,m - t2(d + Ye().7(Nf -1) + 
Y(4.'60.7(Nm -1)-1.8)) 
thus the effect on profit when changing the fertiliser intensity is; 
dic / dXf,m = pq(21.6 - 0.0682Xf,m) - Xwf,m - t2(0.7Nfe().7(Nf -1) + 4.6Nmeu(Nm -1)) 
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for output tax (t3) the profit ic is; 
ic(Xf,m) = (pq - t3)(b + 21.6Xf,m - 0.0341Xf,m2) 
and the effect on profit when changing the fertiliser intensity is; 
dn / dXf,m = (pq - t3)(21.6 - 0.0682Xfm) 
correspondingly the effect on leaching when changing the ferfiliser intensity is; 
dL / dXf,m = 0.7Nfew7( f -1) + 4.6Nmeu(Nm -1) 
weather probability function W---1\10.1,a2), 
average yield = 16,746 kg/ha, standard deviation for the sample = 1,993 kg/ha. 
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Annex 4. Some mathematical proofs. 
Let us inspect the effect of price relationships in the case of output tax. For 
simplicity we can assume that the farm uses only one input, nitrogen, in silage 
production. Regardless of its origin, nitrogen is assumed to be the similar in 
quality and the price of it is w. 
Q = f(x) = quantity of silage production 
t = tax on silage 
p = price of silage 
X* = amount of nitrogen in optimal solution 
w = price of nitrogen 
the profit function can be written as; 
Tc* = (1-t)pf(X*) - wX* 
differentiated with respect to X*, we get; 
37c*/3X* = (1-t)p3f(X*)/SX* - w 
setting this to zero and rearranging; 
(1-0p45f(X*)/SX* = w 
and, in multiplying both sides with X*/Q* where Q* = f(X*) we get; 
(pöf(X*)/SX *)(X */Q*)) = wX*/(p(1-t)Q*) 
in here we note that the left hand side equals to the elasticity of production, E, 
which shows decreasing returns to scale if the right hand side is smaller than 1, 
i.e.; 
wX*  	<1 
p(1— t)Q*  
In general this holds tue, as if we use the average parameter values for w, X*, p 
and Q, and set t to zero, the E is about 0.18. This means, that it does not pay off 
for farmer to use more fertilisers to get higher yield as the price relationships are 
so `obscured'. It is only after the tax on silage price rises to about 0.82 when E 
turns to over one. 
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Similar inequalities can be presented for input tax and nitrogen surplus levy. For 
input tax, h, the formula is; 
(h +1)wX*   <1  
PQ*  
In here, applying the average parameter values and setting h to zero, the E is 
again 0.18. In order for E to be over one h needs to be about 4.6. 
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Annex 5. Regression analyses. 
Analysis from Section 6.2. 
Model Summary 
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a. DeDendent Variable: cattle balance. ka/ha 
Analysis from Section 6.4.2. 
Dependent variable.. Y1ELD 
	
Method.. QUADRATIC 
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data 
Multiple R .48656 
R Square .23675 
Adjusted R Square .12771 
Standard Error 992.51693 
Analysis of Variance: 
DF 	Sum of Squares 	Mean Square 
Regression 2 4277751.1 2138875.5 
Residuals 14 	13791257.9 	985089.8 
F = 2.17125 Signif F = .1509 
Variables in the Equation 	 
Variable SE 	B BetaT ,Sig T 
NITROGEN 22.010193 	26.849767 	.899846 .820 .4261 
NITROGEN**2 -.037640 	.095661 	-.431918 -.393 .6999 
(Constant) 1727.257378 	1842.527007 .937 .3644 
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